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I. INTRODUCTION

A California same-sex couple has been in a committed relationship for
well over a decade.' One of the partners is a young movie producer. While
1. The official Census data recorded in 2000 shows that there were 811,000 households
containing two or more unmarried adults. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 205,

he is somewhat new to the industry, reviews of his films have been positive.
His income is modest but has been substantial enough to allow the other
partner to abstain from formal employment. For the past decade, the
unemployed partner has been able to pursue his hobbies and interests
without worrying about financial issues. This is not to say he has not
contributed to the relationship. He maintains the home in which the couple
resides, provides emotional and familial support for his partner, and renders
other valuable household services.2 Needless to say, the unemployed
partner contributes to the relationship in a substantial, non-economic
manner.
Having been in the relationship for some time, the couple decides to
further solidify their commitment and attain state recognition in early 2000
by registering their partnership with the California Secretary of State. 3 They
both realize that the registration is little more than a token evidencing samesex couples' societal progress. Yet they appreciate the limited rights that
registration actually does convey and are happy to be making a principled
statement through their registration.
Shortly after their registration, the movie producer experiences a
substantial boost in his career. He produces a film which immediately
garnered critical acclaim and eventually puts him in contention for an
Academy Award. In addition to the public recognition, production company
bonuses begin to flood in. His phone is constantly ringing with new offers.
The financial boost for the couple was unexpected. Having more money
than they ever had previously, the couple purchases substantial real estate in
California. With the rising prices of homes in California, each home is
valued at well over 2 million dollars. The couple also acquires various items
of personal property, including two expensive sports cars and a boat.

2003-2004 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2003), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/
ab 0201-0250/ab 205_cfa 20030702_125401 sen comm.html. Of those households, 100,000 were
headed by same-sex partners. Id. Another source shows the exact number as being 92,138.
Gaydemographics.org, http://www.gaydemographics.org/U SA/states/califomia/2000Census-state_
ca.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). The same website also shows that California ranks as the number
one state in total number of same-sex couples. Id. While the United States Census Bureau results
are the most reliable, they are only collected every ten years. Thus, the above numbers were seven
years old when this article was written.
2. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121 (Cal. 1976) ("There is no more reason to presume
that [domestic] services are contributed as a gift than to presume that funds are contributed as a
gift .... ); Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 722 (10th Cir. 1991) (awarding plaintiff
over 1 million dollars for "lost eaming[s]; the loss of household services; and the value for loss of
life"), Cochrane v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, 980 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Kan. 1997) (establishing
different methods for determining the value of household services); Reid v. Moyd, 198 S.E. 703, 705
(Ga. 1938) (valuing household services provided by a two-year-old child with "unusual physical
powers"); see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
SocialAnalysis of Domestic PartnershipOrdinances,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1172 n.40 (1992).
3. The California domestic partners registry was created under A.B. 26, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
1999) (codified as amended at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6 (West 2004)).
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Professional acknowledgement and increased salary creates a busy
schedule for the producer partner; he quickly becomes entrenched in his
career. The unemployed partner starts to realize that he is spending more
and more time alone. The relationship eventually falls apart in December of
2005. The couple realizes that the domestic partnership needs to be
terminated. As far as they are aware, a simple filing with the State office
should be sufficient. Little do they realize, however, that the Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 passed, substantially
affecting their rights in the partnership. 4 Both were aware of letters they
received from the Secretary of State concerning their domestic partnership.
But with all the recent changes in their lives, neither paid the letters any real
attention. 5
The Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 ("the
Act") was arguably the single biggest advancement of rights for same-sex
couples in our nation's history. 6 Not only did the legislation provide a litany
of new rights to couples registered in California as domestic partners, it also
validated domestic partnership as a union deserving legal acknowledgment. 7

4. A.B. 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). Section 2 of the bill dubs the act the Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003. Id.
5. This hypothetical situation is entirely the creation of the author. While many stories of samesex relationships and consequent problems were read prior to the creation of this hypothetical, none
of the facts in the story are the result of any of that research. For more anecdotal information
regarding same-sex couples and difficulties under current laws, see S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS
OF ASSEMBLY BILL 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2003), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/
pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0201-0250/ab_205_cfa_20030702_125401_sen comm.html. See also Will
Harper, See Ya in Court: Registered Same-Sex Partners Can 't Marry, But Now Face Divorce Court
if They Break Up; You Say it Wasn't That Way When You Registered? Tough Luck, Baby: The New
Law is Retroactive, East Bay Express, Oct.
11,
2006, available at http://
news.eastbayexpress.con/2006-10-11/news/see-ya-in-court/; Meghan M. Gavin, The Domestic
Partners Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003: California Extends Significant Protections to
Registered Domestic Partnersand Their Families, 35 MCGEORGE L. REv. 482, 482 n. 1 (2004). See
also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Reaching Backward While Looking Forward: The Retroactive
Effect of California'sDomestic PartnerRights and ResponsibilitiesAct, 54 UCLA L. REV. 185, 198
(2006) (creating a hypothetical couple, Poor and Rich, whom she later uses to illustrate her ideas on
retroactive application of the Act).
6. The creation of the domestic partner registry was also a huge step toward equalizing the
rights of same-sex and heterosexual couples. Yet the creation of the registry did little more than
that. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
The Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act was an amendment to the bill that created the registry and added significant
rights. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
7. The Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, A.B. 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2003) (stating that the Act was "intended to help California move closer to fulfilling the promises of
inalienable rights, liberty, and equality . . . by providing all caring and committed couples,
regardless of their gender or sexual orientation, the opportunity to obtain essential rights, protections,
and benefits and to assume corresponding responsibilities, obligations, and duties .... ) (emphasis
added).
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Admittedly, the Act falls short in some areas of rights to which only married
couples are entitled. Nevertheless, its implications for the development of a
burgeoning body of law cannot be overstated.
The Act's expansive proviso-"Registered domestic partners shall have
the same rights .. .and . ..responsibilities . ..as . ..spouses"-has
repercussions which have yet to be tested by the courts.8 One such gray area

is the imposition of California's community property system onto registered
domestic partners. 9

The Act provides for court-supervised termination

proceedings in which couples will have the same rights and obligations
imposed on divorcing married couples.10

Standing alone, court-supervised

property distributions for same-sex couples are not problematic." But,
applying the community property system and judicial regulation
retroactively to domestic partnerships entered into before the enactment of
the statute, does create issues.' 2 Historically, many cases in California

community property law have faced similar retroactive statutes.

3

Almost

invariably, these same statutes have been challenged on constitutional

grounds as impairments of vested property rights without due process of
law. 14

This article will examine the Act and its retroactive application. It will
also make predictions about the success of constitutional arguments against
applying the Act retroactively. Part II examines the history of domestic
partnerships in California and provides a selected history of California cases

8. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2006).
9. See Matsumura, supra note 5, at 197 (noting that "it seems inevitable that the retroactive
provisions [of the Act] will be challenged in California courts").
10. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299(d) (West 2006). The code section states:
The superior courts shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to the dissolution
of domestic partnerships, nullity of domestic partnerships, and legal separation of
partners in a domestic partnership. The dissolution of a domestic partnership, nullity of a
domestic partnership, and legal separation of partners in a domestic partnership shall
follow the same procedures, and the partners shall possess the same rights, protections,
and benefits, and be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties, as apply
to the dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, and legal separation of spouses in a
marriage, respectively, except as provided in subdivision (a), and except that, in
accordance with the consent acknowledged by domestic partners in the Declaration of
Domestic Partnership form, proceedings for dissolution, nullity, or legal separation of a
domestic partnership registered in this state may be filed in the superior courts of this
state even if neither domestic partner is a resident of, or maintains a domicile in, the state
at the time the proceedings are filed.
Id.
11. The statute is only innocuous in a vacuum. Assuming there was no new property distribution
scheme applied, all property acquired during a domestic partnership would remain the separate
property of the partner who acquired it (absent any contractual agreements to the contrary).
12. See infra notes 313-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.

[Vol. 35: 733, 2008]

Domestic Partner
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

wherein courts decided issues of retroactivity.15 Part III covers more recent
litigation surrounding the Act and its amendments. 16 Part IV then analyzes
the possible impacts of the recent decisions and legislation.' 7 Part V
concludes. "
II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of RegisteredDomestic Partnershipsin California
1.

Prior to the Domestic Partner Registry-Marvin Relationships

California is one of many states that does not recognize common law
marriage.' 9 Before the California domestic partner registry was created in
1999, no form of cohabitation or other committed relationship was legally
recognized in California. 20 Despite the absence of legal recognition for nonmarried couples, Marvin v. Marvin2 1 acknowledged the large number of
non-traditional couples in California nearly thirty years ago.22 In so doing,
the California Supreme Court created an alternative for people who wished
to gain some of the rights of matrimony without the formalities of traditional
marriage. 23
Marvin involved a woman and man who lived together for seven years
without marrying.24 When the relationship ended, the woman claimed the
couple had an oral agreement providing for equal division of any property

15. Infra notes 19-237 and accompanying text.
16. Infra notes 238-306 and accompanying text.
17. Infra notes 307-70 and accompanying text.
18. Infra notes 371-74 and accompanying text.
19. See Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Common Law Marriage Fact Sheet, Alternatives to
Marriage Project, http://www.unmarried.org/commonlaw.pdf (last visited January 21, 2008). In fact,
only fifteen states do recognize common law marriage. Those states are: Alabama, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. California does recognize a common
law marriage legally established in one of these states. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2006).
20. Domestic Partners:Hearingon Assembly Bill 25, Assembly Committee on Judiciary (2001)
("[U]ntil the enactment of AB 26 in 1999, same sex couples and their families received no
recognition under California law.") (quotations omitted), available at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/
acs/committee/c I5/publications/SelectedBillAnalyses/AB%2025%20(Migden)%2ODomestic%20par
tners.htm.
21. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
22. See supra note II.
23. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
24. Id. at 110.
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acquired by either individual during the relationship.25 She also claimed that
the couple held themselves out as husband and wife. 26 The female plaintiff
brought suit for declaratory relief to determine her property and contractual
rights .2 ' The court held that, although the couple was not legally married,
the alleged oral understanding was valid and enforceable. 2' The opinion
was clear that they did not create a new form of putative relationship.29
Rather, the holding was limited to validation of agreements between
unmarried persons
unless they relied solely upon illicit meretricious
0
consideration. 3
Enforcement of express agreements between unmarried couples was
nothing new. 31 However, Marvin's validation of such agreements opened

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.at I10-11.
28. Id. at 122. The court prefaced its holding with a clear statement acknowledging the growing
number of nonmarital cohabitations. Id. While one would likely expect the court to condemn such
practice, this court praised the growing number of young couples living together before marriage as
a type of socially beneficial, pre-marriage test drive.
[W]e believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modem society and the
social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no means
apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship to the
instant case . . . . We are aware that many young couples live together without the
solemnization of marriage, in order to make sure that they can successfully later
undertake marriage. This trial period, preliminary to marriage, serves as some assurance
that the marriage will not subsequently end in dissolution to the harm of both parties. We
are aware, as we have stated, of the pervasiveness of nonmarital relationships in other
situations. The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to
cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that
have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.
Id.
Although it would be an exaggeration to see this as judicial endorsement of non-marital
relationships, the opinion certainly justifies its holding by conforming to the changing social
dynamic.
29. Id. at 122.
30. Id. The court never actually defines "meretricious," the word upon which its holding entirely
relies. Webster's Dictionary defines the term as: "of or relating to a prostitute: having the nature of
prostitution." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 777 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 11th
Ed. 2003), available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/meretricious. It is in this context that the
court's holding takes on more shape.
The mere fact that parties agree to live together in meretricious relationship does not
necessarily make an agreement .. .between them invalid. It is only when the property
agreement is made in connection with the other agreement, or the illicit relationship is
made a consideration of the property agreement, that the latter becomes illegal.
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113 (quoting Croslin v. Scott, 316 P.2d 755, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)).
Ultimately, the qualification allows for enforcement of agreements between unmarried cohabitants
without endorsing illegal conduct.
31. See Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 12 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1932) (holding that nonmarital partners may
lawfully form contracts to govern the distribution of their property); Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761
(Cal. 1943) (holding that equity protects individual interests of parties to a relationship controlled by
a contractual agreement). See generally Jared Laskin, California "Palimony" Law: An Overview,
availableat http://www.palimony.com/7.html.
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the door for homosexual and otherwise unmarried couples to exploit some of
the rights and obligations imposed on their legally married counterparts. If
the couple had some form of cohabitation agreement, an action for breach of
express contract would be sustained. 32 Despite the expansive reach of the
court's holding, there remained only a few cases involving same-sex
partners and express cohabitation agreements. 33 The practical difficulties of
convincing one's partner to sign an agreement giving away property rights
may have often precluded its very existence.34
Despite the import of valid express agreements, Marvin was
revolutionary because the decision stated that, "[i]n the absence of an
express contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties to
determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract .... ",31
Allowing implied enforceable agreements for unmarried cohabitants was
monumental.36 Nonetheless, the court did not stop there: "courts may also
employ . . . quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or

32. See Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Adults who
voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are competent to contract respecting their
earnings and property rights. Such contracts will be enforced 'unless expressly and inseparably
based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services."' (quoting Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116)).
33. While there were a few cases involving heterosexual couples, those involving homosexual
couples were virtually nonexistent. See Cochran v. Cochran, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding male respondent breached an express Marvin agreement which provided for lifetime
support for the female appellant by failing to perform those duties). While Cochran involved a
heterosexual couple, it reaffirmed the Marvin decision.
Though both cases provide rights for heterosexual couples, neither opinion contains language
indicating separate treatment for same-sex unmarried cohabitants. In fact, the Marvin court
intentionally avoided any such distinction with the repeated use of the gender neutral term
"nonmarital partners." 3 WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
GUIDE: FAMILY LAW § 20:147 (The Rutter Group 2005).
One case involving a homosexual couple is Wharton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct.
App. 1988). The homosexual couple in Whorton had a Marvin contract with a meretricious element.
Id. at 408; see also supra note 30. The issue was whether the sexual portion of the consideration
could be severed from the remainder of the contract so as to save it from being meretricious and,
therefore, unenforceable. Wharton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 408. In resolving this issue, the Whorton court
saw no legal reason to distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual couples for applicability of
Marvin. Id. at 408 n. 1.
34. See generally In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 362 (Cal. 1985) (stating that the
retroactive application of the statute "impose[d] a new writing requirement with which [plaintiff]
cannot possibly comply").
35. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110.
36. See Laskin, supra note 31. This article on what the author calls "palimony" discusses
Marvin as creating new law. Id. However, the article also acknowledges that the court did not
create any new causes of action for unmarried cohabitants; it simply treated the group the same, "as
[it does] any other unmarried persons." Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121.

resulting trusts, when warranted . . . .,3 These judicial declarations were
the most significant part of the Marvin holding. 38 Implied agreements
wholly avoid the practical difficulties of express written contracts.3 9 While

the availability of cohabitation agreements implied-in-fact did not create
"marriage" rights for same-sex cohabitants, it did provide recourse upon the
termination of their relationship without requiring couples to jump through
procedural hoops of written agreements. 4 °0 This was the first step in the
development of the current law.4'

37. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. The court went even further in a footnote towards the end of the
opinion, stating, "[we do] not preclude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to protect the
expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove
inadequate .... " Id. at 123 n.25. See also Laskin, supra note 31. Marvin also provided a cause of
action for breach of partnership and joint venture agreements for unmarried cohabitants. Marvin,
557 P.2d at 122 (citing In re Estate of Thorton, 499 P.2d 864, 865 (Wash. 1972)).
38, For instance, the conduct of the parties may have indicated a tacit agreement to share in the
couples' earnings and to either mutually or unilaterally provide support. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at
117-23; Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 898-99 (Ct. App. 1993). Although the
Friedman court eventually held there was insufficient evidence to support an implied contract
between the litigants, it nonetheless recognized the validity of the cause of action and defined its
parameters.
An implied contract "... in no less degree than an express contract, must be founded upon an
ascertained agreement of the parties to perform it, the substantial difference between the two
being the mere mode of proof by which they are to be respectively established.' It is thus an
actual agreement between the parties .... Although an implied in fact contract may be inferred
from the 'conduct, situation or mutual relation of the parties, the very heart of this kind of
agreement is an intent to promise."
Id. at 899 (quoting Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 97 P.2d 798, 804 (Cal. 1939); CAL. CtV.
PROC. CODE § 1621; Div. of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transp. Co., 137 Cal. Rptr.
855, 859 (Ct. App. 1977)). But see Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 762-63 (Cal. 1943) (posing the
issue of "whether a woman living with a man as his wife but with no genuine belief that she is
legally married to him acquires by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his
earnings and accumulations during the period of their relationship" and answering it "in the
negative").
39. Difficulties arise not only in convincing one's partner to sign away property rights, but in the
execution of the agreement itself. Because the agreement will be treated like any other contract,
ensuring its validity is essential.
40. See Robin Leonard & Stephen Elias, Unmarried Couples Living Together,
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/faml4.htm. Marvin also opened the door for equitable contract claims:
constructive trusts, resulting trusts, equitable liens, and quantum meruit. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122-23
("[A] nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of household
services rendered less the reasonable value of support received if he can show that he rendered
services with the expectation of monetary reward."); see also Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d
101, 104-06 (Ct. App. 1998). Although these causes of action were nowhere near the equality
homosexual couples had pushed for, they provided some recourse for same-sex cohabitants.
41. See Leonard, supra note 40 (stating that "[u]ntil 1976, courts generally did not enforce
cohabitation agreements ....
[H]owever, the California Supreme Court ruled in Marvin v. Marvin
that cohabiting couples in California could contract").
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2.

Incremental Legislation and the Development of the Domestic
Partner Registry

Marvin relationships and enforceable cohabitation agreements endured

as the only legal recourse for unmarried cohabitants in California for nearly
twenty-three years.42 In that time, however, certain cities in California were
ahead of the state legislature. Berkeley made the first move in 1984, when
the city council created a policy to provide benefits to the domestic partners

of city employees.43 Berkeley was not alone in its push to equalize the
rights of married and unmarried couples.
One year after Berkeley's
landmark policy was enacted, West Hollywood became the first city in
California to establish a comprehensive domestic partner registry.44

42. Marvin relationships were the only recourse until the creation of the statewide domestic
partner registry in 1999. See supra note 3.
43. City of Berkeley, Domestic Partnership Information, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/dompol.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008); see also Enrique A. Monagas, California'sAssembly Bill 205.
The Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003: Is Domestic Partner Legislation
Compromising the Campaign for Marriage Equality?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44 (2006);
Matsumura, supra note 5, at 188 n.7.
44. See City of West Hollywood, Domestic Partnership Registration, http://www.weho.org/
index.cfm/fuseaction/detailgroup/navid/8/cid/7/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2007); Partners Task Force for
Gay & Lesbian Couples, Registrationfor Domestic Partnership:For the U.S. and Other Countries,
http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-reg.html [hereinafter Partners Task Force] (last visited Feb. 2,
2007); Wikipedia.com, Domestic Partnership,http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Domestic.partnership
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008); see also Monagas, supra note 43, at 44; Matsumura, supra note 5, at 188
n.7 (citing West Hollywood City Council Directs its City Attorney to Investigate Legally Recognizing
Same-Sex Marriages, http://www.weho.org/index.cfm/fuseaction/ detail/navid/346/cid/2479) (last
visited Jan. 21, 2008).
All of this progressive language sounds good on paper. However, it is important to note the
limited rights granted by the registries. It is one thing to register with one's city; it is entirely
another if that registration means something. For example, the frequently asked questions section of
the West Hollywood website on domestic partnership outlines some of the restrictions of registration
within their city limits:
[Q:] "If I am registered in a domestic partnership with the City of West Hollywood and
move to another City, will they recognize my domestic partnership?" [A:] Some of the
cities with Domestic Partnership registration offer reciprocity and will recognize
registration with the City of West Hollywood when couples move to their City. You
should check with your local government City Hall to determine whether they offer
domestic partnership registration or recognize registration with other agencies. [Q:] "I
want to add my partner to my insurance plan. If I register as a domestic partner will I then
be able to add someone to my benefit plan?" [A:] You should always contact
your employer and/or insurance carrier regarding eligibility questions. The City Of
West Hollywood cannot respond to any questions pertaining to your benefit
eligibility ....
[Q:] "What is the difference between The City Of West Hollywood's
domestic partnership registration and the State of California's Registration?" [A:] The
City of West Hollywood's domestic partnership registration is applicable only within our
City limits ....
You do not qualify for the benefits provided by the State of California

Berkeley followed suit in 1991 when it expanded its previous policy to form
its own domestic partner registry.45 Under its new system, all domestic
partners registered with the city of Berkeley received the same benefits
regardless of their employment status.46

California domestic partners were limited to recognition in the very few
municipalities that created rights until 1999. In that year, California created
the nation's first statewide domestic partnership registry. 47 The initial
legislation was dubbed Assembly Bill 26 and was eventually codified in
California Family Code sections 297-299.6. 48 Effective January 1, 2000,
registered participants 49 were granted a new set of rights per their

unless you register directly with them .... [Q:] "How soon after I terminate a domestic
partnership can I file for a new one?" [A:] You must wait six (6) months before filing for
a new domestic partnership.
City
of West
Hollywood,
Frequently Asked
Questions-Domestic Partnerships,
http://www.weho.org/index.cfm/fuseaction/detail/navid/8/cid/1028/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
Although the rights of unmarried cohabitants have been greatly expanded statewide, the city's
current domestic partnership ordinance only discusses hospital and jail visitation rights. West
Hollywood, Ca., Domestic Partnership Ordinance, available at http://www.weho.org/download/
index.cfm/fuseaction/download/cid/1339/. Ironically, the city of West Hollywood has neither a jail
nor a hospital. Partners Task Force, supra note 44.
45. See City of Berkeley, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 3; see also 1999 Legislative Summary, COURT NEWS (Judicial Council of
California, San Francisco, CA), Nov. 1999, at 3, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
courtnews/1 199se.pdf (briefly summarizing AB 26, explaining that the Bill "[d]efines domestic
partners and provides procedures for the registration and termination of domestic partnerships..."
and "[sipecifies domestic partner hospital visitation rights [and] [p]rovides an option for state and
local public employers to extend health benefits to domestic partners .... ); Gavin, supra note 5, at
484; The National Center for Lesbian Rights, The Evolution of California's Domestic Partnership
Law-A Timeline, http://www.nclrights.org/publications/timeline-ab205.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2007) (tracing the evolution of California's Domestic Partnership Law from 1999 to 2006).
48. See supra note 3.
49. The new code established that a domestic partnership is formed when:
(1) Both persons have a common residence[;] (2) [b]oth persons agree to be jointly
responsible for each other's basic living expenses incurred during the domestic
partnership[;] (3) [n]either person is married or a member of another domestic
partnership[;] (4) [t]he two persons are not related by blood in a way that would prevent
them from being married . . . [;] (5) [bloth persons are at least 18 years of age[;] (6)
[e]ither of the following: (A) [b]oth persons are members of the same sex [or] (B)
[o]ne or [b]oth of the persons meet the eligibility criteria . . . of the Social Security
Act... [stating that] persons of opposite sexes may not constitute a domestic partnership
unless one or both persons are over the age of 62[;] (7) [b]oth persons are capable of
consenting to the domestic partnership[;] (8) [n]either person has previously filed a
Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State . . . that has not been
terminated ... [;] (9) [b]oth file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary
of State pursuant to this division.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b) (West 2006).
As the above listed requirements imply, couples were required to file specific registration
documents ("Declaration of Domestic Partnership") to commence a domestic partnership and
termination papers ("Notice of Termination of Domestic Partnership") in order to dissolve the
partnership. Id. § 298. The forms had to be notarized in order to be valid. Id. Although by no
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registration. 50 While the registry did not put same-sex couples on par with
married couples, it was among the most generous set of rights to be
established for homosexual couples nationwide. 5'
Although the registry was a step in the right direction for same-sex
couples, the substantive rights it conferred were sparse. Hospitals were
required to provide visitation privileges to domestic partners. 52 Stateemployed domestic partners were allowed to include their partner in their
employer-provided health plans.53
However, aside from those new
privileges, AB 26 did not change the way the law viewed same-sex
couples. 5 4 The act specifically excluded any change in the status of property
held by either partner before registration. 55 It also refused to create any
rights in property incident to registration. 6 Domestic partners also received
means equal to marriage, the added formality brought California domestic partnerships closer to
legally recognized marital unions.
It is important to note that the domestic partner registry also applied equally upon creation to
opposite sex couples. § 297(5)(B). This subsection provided a means for opposite sex couples "over
the age of 62," who may have been widowed or divorced, to enter into a relationship without having
to remarry. Id. Application to opposite sex couples in this way continues throughout this
article-all the amendments and new statutes affecting the registry discussed herein affect this set of
domestic partners equally. However, this article focuses on the registry in the context of same-sex
relationships and thus approaches the analysis solely from that vantage point.
50. § 297.
51. See Human Rights Campaign, Relationship Recognition in the U.S. (Washington, D.C.,
updated Jul. 24, 2007), available at http://dev.hrc.org/documents/Relationship-recognition-map.pdf.
This map shows that only one state, Massachusetts, provides marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Id. Only four states--California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont-currently have "statewide
law [that provides] the equivalent of state-level spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state."
Id. Within that group, California stands as the only state to offer domestic partnerships (although
Oregon will soon offer the same, effective January 2008), and three of those states-Vermont,
Connecticut and New Jersey-provide for civil unions (although New Hampshire will soon offer the
same, effective January 2008). Id. Four more states-Hawaii, Maine, Washington State, and the
District of Columbia-have "statewide law [that provides] some statewide spousal rights to samesex couples .... Id.
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1261 (West 2006). The required visitation privileges were
subject to some limitations, none of which had to do with sexual orientation and all of which were
likely imposed on all visitors regardless of their marital/registration status. Id.
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 22867-77 (West 2003), repealed by Act of June 23, 2004, ch. 69, A.B.
3063, 2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004); see also Matsumura, supra note 5, at 189 n. II and accompanying
text.
54. See Matsumura, supra note 5, at 189.
55. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.5(c) (West 2006), repealed by A.B. 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2003).
56. Id. § 299.5(d). This was not to say that registered domestic partners were not legally able to
order their financial affairs. This portion of the statute expressly allows for domestic partners to
acquire property together during the domestic partnership, but the character of joint ownership must
have been "expressly agreed [to] in writing by both parties." Id. § 299.5(e). In effect, requiring a
writing for this sort of "cohabitation agreement" imposed a heavier burden on registered couples
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the same tax treatment as they had as single individuals. 7 While AB 26
provided recognition for same-sex couples vis-A-vis the registry, it did little
to expand the rights they received.
Over time, amendments were made and provisions were added to the
California domestic partnership registry. In 2001, Assembly Bill 25 was
passed.58 It was written by Carole Midgen, the same assembly member who
wrote AB 26.59 The Bill greatly expanded the rights provided under the
domestic partner registry. 60 AB 25 provided domestic partners with "a
cause of action for . . . negligent infliction of emotional distress and ...
wrongful death.", 6 1 It allowed domestic partners to adopt each other's
children using the same procedures as married stepparent adoptions.62 The
Bill extended state-provided benefits to a surviving domestic partner after
the death of a state-employed partner.63 Domestic partners were authorized
to make personal medical decisions and to file for state disability benefits on
behalf of a disabled partner.64 The legislation forced group health care plans
to treat registered domestic partners and married spouses uniformly. 65 It
required employers who allowed employees to use sick leave to care for a
sick spouse to allow the same privilege for domestic partners and their
The Bill also provided a host of rights which eased the
children.66
administration of a deceased partner's estate. 67
The privileges provided under AB 25 were legal rights that had always
Nevertheless, the
been enjoyed by heterosexual married couples.68
legislature declined to create laws affecting domestic partners' property.69

than on unmarried cohabitants before AB 206 passed. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 115 n.9
(Cal. 1976) (refusing to apply statute of fraud requirements to agreements between nonmarital
partners).
57. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.5(f) (West 2006), repealedby A.B. 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2003).
58. A.B. 0025, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Governor Gray Davis recognized that the bill was not the creation of new rights, but rather
equalizing the rights of various family dynamics. Id. In an act of political hedging, the Governor
signed the bill and remarked, "This legislation does nothing to contradict or undermine the definition
of a legal marriage, nor is it about special rights. It is about civil rights, respect, responsibility, and,
most of all, it is about family." Id. He reaffirmed his adherence to the traditional marital unions
even while signing the bill which granted extensive rights to homosexual couples. Id. Davis further
stated, "In California, a legal marriage is between a man and a woman. I believe the only things that
can undermine the bonds of a strong marriage are ignorance and fear." Id.
69. See Matsumura, supra note 5, at 191.
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Following the enactment of AB 25, various other bills passed in California
adding new rights for domestic partners and modifying those already
Domestic partners were given everything from inclusion in
created. 70
intestate succession 7' to the right to draft wills for one another.72
Following the piecemeal addition of rights to the domestic partner
registry that occurred between 1999 and 2002, the Legislature penned the
single most significant addition to California's domestic partnership
registry-the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003. 73
The Bill, which was codified in California Family Code section 297.5,
provides:
Registered domestic partners
and benefits, and shall be
obligations, and duties under
administrative regulations,
common law, or any other
granted to and imposed upon

shall have the same rights, protections,
subject to the same responsibilities,
law, whether they derive from statutes,
court rules, government policies,
provisions or sources of law, as are
spouses.74

The law, which was slated to take effect January 1, 2005, 7 did two very
important things for California registered domestic partners. First, the new
law provided judicially supervised distribution of domestic partnership
property upon dissolution.76 A dissolution proceeding, similar to a divorce
for married couples, was the default provided by the Act.77 Domestic
partners could avoid this formality by filing a Notice of Termination with

70. See Evolution of California's Domestic Partnership Law, supra note 47.
71. A.B. 2216, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
72. A.B. 1575, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). Even though domestic partners were allowed to
receive property from one another upon death and able to take part in designating where their
partner's property was to go on death, they were still not included in California's property or spousal
protection schemes. Id.
73. See supra note 4.
74. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2006). Former domestic partners, surviving domestic
partners, domestic partners with children, and domestic partners as prospective parents were also
granted rights equal to their legally married counterparts. Id. § 297.5(b)-(e).
75. Id. § 297.5.
76. Id. § 299.3. This section required notice to be sent to all registered domestic partners. The
notice disclosed, "[D]omestic partners will have a great many new rights and responsibilities,
including laws governing community property, those governing property transfer, those regarding
duties of mutual financial support and mutual responsibilities for certain debts to third parties, and
Id.; see also Equality California, AB 205 Fact Sheet, available at
many others."
http://www.eqca.org/atf/cf/%7B687DF34F-6480-4BCD-9C2B- F33FD8E1294%7D/factsheetab205.pdf (last updated Aug. 18, 2003); Monagas, supra note 43, at 49.
77. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299(a) (West 2006).
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the Secretary of State if they met a series of stringent requirements

prescribed by the Act.78
Application of judicial oversight to domestic partnership terminations
not only meant that the intricacies of the community property system
applied, 79 but that all property rights and obligationshad by married couples

affected registered domestic partners as well.8 ° Undoubtedly, this was the
most significant effect of the Act. The law effectively abrogated the
unpredictable system of Marvin agreements upon which domestic partners
wanting to control their property rights were previously forced to rely."t
82

The Act's second significant impact was that it applied retroactively.
Many rationales for retroactivity have been advanced, including the
California Legislature's desire to reduce administration costs and provide
83
dependent domestic partners a larger share of the newly community funds.
78. Id. § 299(a)(1)-(10) (West Supp. 2007). The requirements are:
(1) The Notice of Termination . . . [must be] signed by both registered domestic
partners[;] (2) There are no children of the relationship of the parties born [or adopted]
before or after registration of the domestic partnership . . . [;] (3) The . . . partnership

is not more than five years in duration[;] (4) Neither party has any interest in real
property ...

[;] (5) There are no unpaid obligations in excess of [S4,000] ...

excluding

[an automobile loan;] (6) The total fair market value of community [and separate]
property assets . . . is less than . . . [$25,000 each;] (7) The parties have executed an

agreement setting forth the division of assets . . . [;] (8) The parties waive any rights to
support by the other domestic partner[;] (9) The parties have read and understand a
brochure prepared by the Secretary of State describing the . . . effect of terminating a
domestic partnership[;] and (10) Both parties desire that the domestic partnership be
terminated.
Id.; see also Secretary of State of Cal., Terminating a California Registered Domestic Partnership
(last revised Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/dpregistry/forms/sfdpterm
brochure.pdf.
79. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2006) ("[A]ll property, real or personal, wherever situated,
acquired by a married person [or registered domestic partner] during the marriage [or registered
domestic partnership] while domiciled in this state is community property.").
80. The added rights and responsibilities included liability of each partner to the other's
creditors, child support obligations to children of former partners, martial support rights after
dissolution of the partnership, and a court supervised dissolution proceeding. See Harper, supra note
5; Virginia Palmer, The New Domestic Partnership Law, http://www.ceb.com/info/ab205.htm.
81. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text. The Act was the closest same-sex couples
had gotten in California to having their relationships legitimized. By making domestic partnerships
subject to the community property system, the Legislature forced spousal support on same-sex
couples. In so doing, they recognized that a financially dependent partner in a same-sex relationship
contributes equally to the partnership as a financially dependent spouse does to a marriage.
Providing forced spousal protection schemes for domestic partnerships solidified same-sex
committed relationships as legitimate.
82. The initial legislation said nothing as to when the new rights and responsibilities were to
apply and, therefore, prospective application was presumed. Monagas, supra note 43, at 56; see also
infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. The legislature quickly addressed the oversight in 2004
with AB 2580. A.B. 2580, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). The Bill was an amendment to the
Act which declared, "This bill would provide that any reference to the date of a marriage also be
deemed to refer to the date of registration of a domestic partnership with the state with regard to,
among other things, community property or the dissolution of a partnership." Id.
83. See Harper, supra note 5 (quoting Frederick Hertz, author of Living Together: A Legal Guide
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Whatever the reason, the provision effectively created a five-year period of

possible retroactivity. 84 Although five years may not seem important, for
partners with large income disparities who registered at the inception of the

registry, it has the potential to be a significant hindrance. 85

Recognizing potential for ill effects, the Legislature included a provision

for pre-registration agreements in the Act. 86 This portion of the legislation
was essentially a reassurance to domestic partners that their Marvin

agreements would be legally enforced even if the Act applied to their
relationship. 87 Enforcing pre-registration agreements created an "opt-out"
provision within the Act because it would be enforced against couples absent
such an agreement. 88 Making application the default provision placed the
onus on registered couples to keep abreast of their rights if they desired

ultimate control over their affairs.
In order to take advantage of the available opt-out provision, registered
domestic partners had to be aware of the pending changes. 89 To that end,
the Act further required the California Secretary of State to send out three
notice letters to the addresses under which domestic partners had

for Unmarried Couples). Another rationale is that the Legislature made the Act retroactive so that
those who had registered under the previous law would not have to reregister. Matsumura, supra
note 5,at 193-95.
84. Matsumura, supra note 5, at 196-97 ("[W]ith AB 2580 . . .the Assembly extended the
responsibilities concerning . . .the ownership of property, to the date that the partnership first
registered under .. .AB 26[,J . . .effectively transform[ing] separate property acquired during a
window of up to five years into community property.").
85. See infra notes 319-70 and accompanying text.
86. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(k)(2) (West Supp. 2007) ("[F]or domestic partnerships registered
with the state before January 1,2005, an agreement between the domestic partners that the partners
intend to be governed by the [Uniform Premarital Act] ...shall be enforceable ... if that agreement
was fully executed and in force as of June 30, 2005.").
87. Id.
88. Id. This provision put domestic partners on par with married couples in yet another area.
California community property attaches automatically to all marriages absent a written agreement to
the contrary. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-20 (West 2006).
89. Notice is also one of the paramount requirements of due process. See City of W. Covina v.
Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999) (stating that, "when law enforcement agents seize property...
due process requires them ... to give notice that the property has been taken"); Mennonite Bd. of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (holding that the State has a constitutional obligation
to provide actual notice to a mortgagee of real property subject to a tax sale if they are particularly
inexperienced in the area"); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(holding that due process requires notice and a hearing before wages may be garnished). Thus,
requiring that the Secretary of State provide notice to registered domestic partners about the
significant amendments to their rights was likely an act of Legislative foresight anticipating the
possibility of due process litigation. For a discussion on the success of the preemptive solution to
the constitutional problems with the Act's retroactive application, see infra notes 359-70 and
accompanying text.

747

registered. 9°

Additionally, the Secretary of State was required to post

similar information on his official website9" and provide notice of the
changes with each new domestic partner registration form. 92
The Act and its various provisions brought domestic partnership to its
most progressive point regarding the rights it granted to same-sex couples.
However, simply declaring that domestic partnerships were to be governed

by community property laws was not enough to make it so. Retroactivity
only added to the difficulties inherent in applying a property scheme to a

new group of individuals. California courts have long been challenged by

90. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.3(a) (West Supp. 2007). The statute required that the notice letters
be sent on or before June 30, 2004, December 1, 2004, and January 31, 2005. Id. Each letter read:
Dear Registered Domestic Partner:
This letter is being sent to all persons who have registered with the Secretary of State as a
domestic partner.
Effective January 1, 2005, California's law related to the rights and responsibilities of
registered domestic partners will change (or, if you are receiving this letter after that date,
the law has changed, as of January 1, 2005). With this new legislation, for purposes of
California law, domestic partners will have a great many new rights and responsibilities,
including laws governing community property, those governing property transfer, those
regarding duties of mutual financial support and mutual responsibilities for certain debts
to third parties, and many others. The way domestic partnerships are terminated is also
changing. After January 1, 2005, under certain circumstances, it will be necessary to
participate in a dissolution proceeding in court to end a domestic partnership.
Domestic partners who do not wish to be subject to these new rights and responsibilities
MUST terminate their domestic partnership before January 1, 2005. Under the law in
effect until January 1, 2005, your domestic partnership is automatically terminated if you
or your partner marry or die while you are registered as domestic partners. It is also
terminated if you send to your partner or your partner sends to you, by certified mail, a
notice terminating the domestic partnership, or if you and your partner no longer share a
common residence. In all cases, you are required to file a Notice of Termination of
Domestic Partnership.
If you do not terminate your domestic partnership before January 1, 2005, as provided
above, you will be subject to these new rights and responsibilities and, under certain
circumstances, you will only be able to terminate your domestic partnership, other than as
a result of your domestic partner's death, by the filing of a court action.
Further, if you registered your domestic partnership with the state prior to January 1,
2005, you have until June 30, 2005, to enter into a written agreement with your domestic
partner that will be enforceable in the same manner as a premarital agreement under
California law, if you intend to be so governed.
If you have any questions about any of these changes, please consult an attorney. If you
cannot find an attorney in your locale, please contact your county bar association for a
referral.
Sincerely,
The Secretary of State
Id.
91. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.3(b) (West 2006). While abbreviated, the online notice provided
substantially similar information. Notably, it directed partners that their rights had been significantly
changed, that termination of partnerships had new requirements, and it advised couples to consult a
qualified attorney to discuss the ramifications. Id.
92. Id.
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retroactive legislation, especially so in community property. 93 From those
challenges has arisen a body of law dictating when and how community
property statutes can retroactively apply. 94 What follows is a brief summary
of that precedent.
B. Retroactivity and the California Community PropertySystem

Analysis of community

property statutes

and their retroactive

application comes by way of case law. However, since the domestic partner

registry is still in its infancy and community property for registered partners
is just under two years old, there is scant precedent on point. 95 Therefore, a

general overview of retroactivity and a summary of judicial decisions on
retrospective community property statutes are helpful in predicting how the
courts will handle retroactive application of the Act.
1. The Presumption Against Retroactivity
Generally, laws are created to apply prospectively. 96 The predilection

for prospective legislation has roots in both Greek and Roman law. 97 It is
based on the theory that the ability of citizens to order their affairs and to
predict the outcomes of their behaviors based upon set and certain rules is
essential to the organization of any society. 98 This principle survived
through the development of the common law and into our modem justice
system.99 It remains today as a general presumption in favor of prospective
application of legislation.' 00

93. See infra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. In fact, there has yet to be a case directly on point-that is, a case involving a same-sex
couple who challenge the retroactive application of the Act to the termination of their relationship
created prior to the Act's enactment.
96. See, e.g., Gene A. Maguire, Retroactive Application of Statutes: Protection of Reliance
Interests, 40 ME. L. REv. 183, 183-84 (1988) (stating that although legislatures "may enact a statute
to have retroactive effect ...courts traditionally interpret statutes to apply prospectively absent clear
indication of legislative intent to the contrary").
97. Id. at 183 n.4; see also Andrew C. Weiler, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial
Rubberstampingof Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1069 (1993) ("Fundamental to
a civilized and just society is a recognition that citizens should be able to understand the obligations
and sanctions that the legal system imposes on them. Retroactive application of the law has
historically been seen as inimical to this norm .....
98. Maguire, supra note 96, at 183 n.4.
99. Id. at 183; Weiler, supra note 97, at 1069-70.
100. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764-65 (2006) ("If a statutory provision
'would operate retroactively' as applied to cases pending at the time the provision was enacted, then

749

The presumption's deep roots and ability to persevere do not, however,
conclusively prohibit retroactive legislation. To the contrary, backward-

reaching laws are passed quite frequently. 1 ' Just as often as laws assert
retroactive application, they are challenged. 02 Invariably, the challenges are

based upon violations of constitutional rights.' 03 Courts dealing with such
challenges have consistently determined that retroactive legislation only
applies

when

the

legislature

expressly

so

indicated. 104

However,

determination of legislative intent is only one factor in the constitutional
question.'05 What follows is an abridged summary of California community
property cases that tested retroactive statutes and shaped the analysis for
determining when such application was constitutional.
2.

Retroactive Application of California Community Property Law

The evolution of the California community property system is long and
complex. 10 6 Within the system there have been various statutes and
amendments which professed to apply retrospectively.'0 7 Introduction of
each of these pieces of legislation spurned subsequent litigation over the
constitutionality of the respective statutory provision. "0 Similarly, the Act

[the court's] 'traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent
favoring such a result."'); Femandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2428 (2006) ("[Wie ask
If the answer is yes, we
whether applying the statute ... would have a retroactive consequence ....
then apply the presumption against retroactivity ...[in the] 'absen[ce of] a clear indication from
Congress that it intended such a result."' (citations omitted)); see also Maguire, supra note 96, at
203. But see Weiler, supra note 97, at 1078 (asserting that the current presumption is in favor of
validating retroactive economic laws).
101. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act
was non-punitive and therefore could be applied retroactively without violating the ex post facto
clause of the United States Constitution); see also infra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
102. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (challenging the retroactive application of a statute
requiring company to pay additional medical benefits to employees after the company left the
industry as an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (challenging retroactive application of an
addition to a statutory section dealing with habeas corpus petitions); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) (challenging retroactive application of an amendment to
the False Claims Act).
103. See infra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution ofAmerican Community
PropertyLaw and Their Import to EquitableDistributionStates, 23 FAM. L.Q. 163 (1989).
107. CAL. FAM. CODE § 125 (West 2006) (applying the quasi-community property scheme
retroactively); CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2006) (applying the separate property presumption
retroactively); CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 2580-81 (West 2006) (attempting to apply the community
property presumption for all jointly held property retroactively); see also infra notes 117-236 and
accompanying text; Stephen M. Tennis, Retroactive Application of California's Community
PropertyStatutes, 18 STAN. L. REV. 514 (1966).
108. Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1965) (challenging the retroactive application of
California's quasi-community property law as an unconstitutional impairment of a vested right); In
/ JVI

[Vol. 35: 733, 2008]

Domestic Partner
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

has entered into the realm of California family law with promises of
retroactivity. 0 9 Based upon prior incidents, it follows that a constitutional
challenge will eventually surface.
When the constitutionality of the Act is finally challenged, it will likely
come in the form of a challenge to retroactive application of the community
property system to registered couples. " 0 Since there is no case law directly
on point,"' a history of how the court has handled retroactive application of

community property laws is the closest alternative to precedent. In addition
to working under identical systems, the Act claims to put domestic partners
on equal ground with married couples." 2 Because it grants all the rights and
imposes all the responsibilities of marriage," 13 there should be no difference
in application of the law between the two distinct groups.' ' 4 For the

foregoing reasons, an overview of the progression of retroactive California
community property legislation provides a reasonably accurate forecast of
the future application of the Act.
Many of the retroactive laws were expansions of the rights of women in

the community property system. 115 The remainder of the history comes
from statutes dealing with joint tenancy. 116 The following section is broken

down chronologically as each piece of legislation was introduced and
according to the type of law it concerns.

re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976) (challenging the retroactive application of
community property law altering community property status of husband's post-separation income).
For constitutional challenges to the California Family Code section 2581 dealing with concurrent
estates, see In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354 (Cal. 1985) (constitutionally challenging § 2581 as
an impairment of vested rights); In re Marriage of Hilke, 841 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1992); In re Marriage
of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349 (Cal. 1995). See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text; see also
Viiu Spangler, Happily Settled Ever After: In re Marriage of Heikes and Retroactivity, 18 WHITTIER
L. REv. 339 (1997).
109. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
110. See generallysupra note 76.
111. This is to say that at the time this article was written, there was no case law dealing with
domestic partners and retroactive application of the community property system.
112. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
113. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2006).
114. See supra note 33 (discussing the Marvin court's treatment of the same-sex issue as entirely
avoiding any distinction on the basis of sexual orientation).
115. See infra notes 117-78 and accompanying text. It seems strangely appropriate to use the
legislative history involved in expanding the rights of one previously oppressed group to discuss
how the court will deal with expanding the property rights of another historically repressed group.
116. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2580-81 (West 2006). See infra notes 179-236 and accompanying text.

i.

Application of California'sQuasi-CommunityProperty Scheme

From its inception, retroactive application of the quasi-community
property statute was problematic for courts." 7 The struggle was played out
in the 1965 case of Addison v. Addison. 8 Morton and Leona Addison were
married in Illinois in 1939 and moved to California ten years later.' 19 The
couple brought property which had accumulated as a result of Morton's
Illinois business ventures during the marriage. 2 0 After twelve years of
California residency, Leona sought a divorce from Morton and requested an
equitable division of the marital assets.' 2' Leona's petition claimed that the
newly adopted California quasi-community property statute should apply to
the couple's divorce. '2 She averred that the property held in her husband's
name alone was acquired using property brought by the couple from Illinois
to California. 2 3 She further testified that the property in question
would
24
have been community property had it been acquired in California.
The defendant, Morton, opposed the application of the quasi-community
property statute to property he held before the statute's enactment on two
constitutional grounds.125 First, he alleged that the law deprived him of a
vested property interest without due process of law. 1 6
To resolve

117. The California Family Code reads:
'Quasi-community property' means all real or personal property, wherever situated,
acquiredbefore or after the operative date of this code in any of the following ways:
(a) By either spouse while domiciled elsewhere which would have been community
property if the spouse who acquired the property had been domiciled in this state at the
time of its acquisition.
(b) In exchange for real or personal property, wherever situated, which would have been
community property if the spouse who acquired the property so exchanged had been
domiciled in this state at the time of its acquisition.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 125 (West 2006) (emphasis added). For a somewhat historical table of
California community property statutes with retroactivity problems, see Tennis, supra note 107, at
524.
118. 399 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1965).
119. Id. at 898.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 898-99. At the time of the case, the quasi-community property statute was CAL. CIV.
CODE § 140.5, enacted in 1961. Leona's petition for divorce was filed February 20, 1961. Id. at
898. The opinion is dated March 15, 1965. Id. at 897.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 899. These elements were sufficient to state a claim under the quasi-community
property statute.
125. Defendant relied on Estate of Thorton, 33 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1934), as his primary controlling
precedent. Id. at 901. Both contentions of unconstitutionality arise from Thorton 's logic.
126. Id. at 902. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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defendant's due process challenge, the court recognized the general rule that
vested rights may not be impaired without due process of law. 127 However,
the court quickly inserted an exception to the general rule, stating, "'[v]ested
rights . . .may be impaired . . .whenever reasonably necessary to the

protection of the health, safety, morals, and general well being of the

people."" 128 The court's discussion turned to the state interest in regulating
matrimonial property.129 It stated that the quasi-community property statute
at issue was a means of protecting those property interests and was "'of large
social importance.""..30
Applying the above law to the facts of the case, the court zeroed in on
the protection of morals allowed under the exception."'3 The court held that
the deprivation of property rights occasioned on the defendant was not
unconstitutional because the state was appropriately using its police power
to uphold societal morals. 132 It was exceedingly clear that the court's
rationale was heavily influenced by the defendant's adultery. '33 Infact, this
consideration alone justified the court's holding. 14
The defendant's second constitutional challenge to the retroactive
application of the quasi-community property statute was premised on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3' The

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
127. Addison, 399 P.2d at 901 ("[C]hanges in the community property system which affected
'vested interests' could not constitutionally be applied retroactively but must be limited to
prospective application." (citing Spreckels v. Spreckels, 48 P. 228 (Cal. 1897)).
128. Id. at 902 (quoting Barbara N. Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in
Community Property Control-Rule of Property or ConstitutionalNecessity?, 33 CAL. L. REV. 476,
495 (1945)). Under the exception, the California Supreme Court refrained the issue. Id. The court
saw it as a question of whether there was a sufficient public justification for applying the new law,
rather than whether a vested property right had been impaired. Id. Another commentator framed the
issue as whether the enactment of the statute was a "valid exercise of the [state's] police power."
Tennis, supra note 107, at 518. Tennis claims that the court then balances, "the interest to be
promoted against the right to be impaired." Id. at 519. So long as the state's interest is greater than
the individual right they are impairing, the exercise of police power is valid. Id.
129. Addison, 399 P.2d at 902.
130. Id. (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
131. Id. at 903.
132. Id. In essence, it was the couple's choice to divorce which caused the deprivation of property
rights, not the relocation across state lines. Id.
133. Id. The court makes no attempt to disguise the fact that it rules for the plaintiff because of its
contempt for the defendant's infidelity. It conditions its rule on the infidelity of the property-holding
spouse: "[W]here the innocent [i.e. faithful] party would otherwise be left unprotected the state has a
very substantial interest and one sufficient to provide for a fair and equitable distribution of the
marital property without running afoul of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
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court quickly dismissed the argument, stating that the legislation did not
cause any loss of rights due to the couple's relocation because the law was
13 6

only applicable in divorce or separate maintenance proceedings.
37
Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply. 1
The opinion also addressed defendant's contention that the statute was
inapplicable because it was enacted after the dissolution proceeding was

As quickly as it dismissed the defendant's two
commenced. 138
' 39
the court labeled this argument "untenable. ,1
challenges,
constitutional

According to the court, the statute was not being applied retroactively. 140
Since the genesis of the case was the divorce filing, any argument that the

legislation improperly affected property rights was precluded.141 The
holding reaffirmed this position, noting that even though the law was
enacted after the lawsuit was filed, its application was not retroactive

because the judgment of divorce was also entered after the enactment of the
statute. 142

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
136. Addison, 399 P.2d at 903. The Privileges and Immunities Clause guarantees citizens that
they will be allowed to travel and indeed create a domicile in any state of the United States without
losing valuable rights. Id. While this situation seems ripe for such a challenge, the court
distinguished the rights granted under the Privileges and Immunities Clause from those being
affected in this case. Id. Since the institution of divorce proceedings, not the change of domicile,
was what caused the loss of property rights, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not violated.
Id. Had the couple remained married, their property rights would have remained the same as they
were before their move. Id.
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, .. .the privileges and immunities
clause ... does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where there are
perfectly valid independent reasons for it .... [T]he inquiry must also, of course, be
conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should have considerable
leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures. In the case at bar,
Leona ...is a member of a class of people who lost the protection afforded [her in her
prior domiciliaryl had [she] sought a divorce there before leaving that state. She has lost
that protection, and is thus in need of protection from California. Hence, the
discrimination, if there be such, is reasonable and not of the type [the Privileges and
Immunities Clause] seeks to enjoin.
Id. at 903-04 (quotations and citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.at 904.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Following its analysis, the court proclaimed, "Nor is the statute being applied
retroactively. That is so because the legislation here involved neither creates nor alters rights except
upon divorce or separate maintenance. The judgment of divorce was granted after the effective date
of the legislation. Hence the statute is being applied prospectively." It seems strange that after an
entire opinion dismantling constitutional challenges to the retroactive application of the statute in
question, a court would insert a sentence such as this one. In this respect, the statement has been
heavily criticized and analyzed since the opinion was published. According to the court in Bouquet,
the Addison court clearly applied the statute retroactively and thus, "[tihe quoted passage was
probably intended to convey the modest message that the court was not applying the 1961 legislation
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Addison was a starting point in the evolution of retroactive legislation in
the California community property system. 143 Its holding cemented the
proposition that vested property rights may
be constitutionally impaired
44
when justified by a sufficient state interest. 1
ii. Post-SeparationEarnings
After the Addison decision, the court again struggled with applying 145a
community property statute retroactively in In re Marriage of Bouquet.
The Bouquets were married in California in 1941.146 Two years after their
separation in 1969, the wife filed for divorce and determination of their
property rights. 147 After the divorce petition was filed, but before the court
granted the divorce, an amended civil code section took effect. 148 The new
section read: "the earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor
children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate
149
and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."'
The previous section of the civil code provided that only the wife's earnings
and accumulations during separation were separate property. 150
The amended section had positive effects on the husband's property
interests. 151 He therefore argued for retroactive application of the new law

in a way that would disturb judgments handed down prior to itseffective date on the basis of the
then-prevailing law." In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1377 n.10 (Cal. 1976) (citing
William A. Reppy, Jr., Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S.
CAL. L. REv. 977, 1083 (1975); Donald C. Knutson, CaliforniaCommunity PropertyLaws: A Plea
for Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 240, 270 (1966); Barbara Brudno Gardner,
Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: The Constitutionality of the "Quasi-Community
Property" Legislation, 54 CAL. L. REV. 252, 266-267 (1966); Stephen M. Tennis, Retroactive
Application of California'sCommunity Property Statutes, 18 STAN. L. REv. 514, 520-21 (1966)).
143. See generally Tennis, supra note 107.
144. Addison, 399 P.2d at 903.
145. 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976).
146. Id. at 1372.
147. Id.

148. Id. The section was CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118, repealed by 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. 162. The
1992 amendment was codified in CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2006) and remains today
substantially the same as the Civil Code version.
149. 546 P.2d at 1372 n.1.
150. Id. at 1372 n.2.
151. The couple separated March 2, 1969. Id. at 1372. The effective date of the amendment was
March 4, 1972. Id. The husband wanted the statute applied to his earnings acquired since the
separation (3/2/69), as opposed to since the statute's enactment date (3/4/72). Id. Such a holding
provided the husband with return of the one-half interest in his earnings which the wife acquired
under the old law.

to all his earnings during the entire period of separation.'5 2 In her own selfinterest, the wife contested that argument. 53 She claimed, among other
things, that retroactive application of the statute to the husband's earnings
during separation would unconstitutionally deprive her of vested property
rights in her husband's post-separation income. '14
The court unhesitatingly agreed with the husband's interpretation of the
statute."'
The holding not only resolved the immediate issue, but it
provided the constitutional framework for analyzing questions of
retrospective statutory application in California.' 56 That analysis is twofold. The first step is to determine whether the legislature intended the
statute to apply retroactively. 57
' According to the court, the starting point
15
general presumption against retroactivity, 8
the
is
determination
this
for
rebuttable by express statutory language evincing contrary legislative
intent.159 In this case, "[t]he language of the amendment [did] little to reveal
the Legislature's intent regarding the amendment's prospective or
retroactive application," thereby forcing the court's analysis to another
step. t60

152. Id. The husband was given leave to amend his original complaint after the enactment of the
statute. Id. It was in this amended complaint that the husband asserted that the statute should apply
retroactively to his earnings since separation. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1376; see also Matsumura, supra note 5, at 208.
155. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1372.
156. Matsumura cites what she calls, the Bouquet court's "fairness concerns." Matsumura, supra
note 5, at 209. The three factors are: "(1) the extent of reliance by the aggrieved party on the former
version of the law; (2) the legitimacy of that reliance; and (3) the degree to which retroactive
application of the new law would disrupt settled expectations." Id. The Bouquet court articulated
the factors a little differently. See Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376. The court stated that to determine
whether retroactive application of a statute breached due process rights, consideration must be given
to:
[T]he significance of the state interest served by the law, the importance of the retroactive
application of the law to the effectuation of that interest, the extent of reliance upon the
former law, the legitimacy of that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that
reliance, and the extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would disrupt
those actions.
Id. While this section of the court's analysis is crucial to its rationale, it is not the most important
factor to pull from the case. Rather, these factors are part of the larger analysis, and they aid in
determining but one of the three steps of the court's test. See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying
text.
157. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1372.
158. Id. at 1372-73 (citing Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 373 P.2d 640 (Cal. 1962);
DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 367 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1962)).
159. Of the rebuttal, the court states, "We have explicitly subordinated the presumption against
the retroactive application of statutes to the transcendent canon of statutory construction that the
design of the Legislature be given effect." Id. at 1373 (citing Mannheim v. Superior Court, 478 P.2d
17 (Cal. 1970)).
160. Id.
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In cases with questions of retroactivity, legislative silence is not rare and
does not end the first portion of the inquiry. The court relied on In re
Estrada for the proposition that, "'[w]here the Legislature has not set forth
in so many words what it intended, the [presumption] should not be followed
blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the
legislative intent."""' Additionally, the presumption against retroactive
legislation should only be applied after, "'consideringallpertinentfactors,it
is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent.,,1 62 The
"pertinent factors" which elucidated legislative intent were: "[the] context,
the object[ive] ... , the evils to be remedied, the history of. . .legislation
63
upon the same [topic], public policy, and contemporaneous construction." 1
Analysis of the factors laid out above provided the Bouquet court little
help. The only tangible evidence of intent was a letter written on a Senate
resolution indicating one assembly member's view that the statute was to
operate retroactively. 164 The letter and the complete lack of evidence
showing a contrary intent supported a legislative intent in favor of
retroactivity. 16 Had the court reached the contrary conclusion, the inquiry
would have ended there.' 66 However, because it determined the amendment
was intended to have a retroactive effect, it continued on to the second prong
of the test. 167

161. Id. (quoting In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 952 (Cal. 1965)).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. (quoting Alford v. Piemo, 104 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114 (Ct. App. 1972); citing Estate of
Jacobs, 142 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1943)).
164. Id. at 1374-76. The court discussed the letter extensively but prefaced the discussion with a
disclaimer as to its relevance: "[a]lthough the letter is irrelevant to the extent that it merely reflects
the personal views of Assemblyman Hayes, it is quite relevant to the extent that it evidences the
understanding of the Legislature as a whole." Id. at 1374.
165. Id. at 1375 ("Apart from the . . .letter, the legislative history is silent on the issue of
retroactivity. In short, the only indicators of legislative intent ascertainable in this case call for the
retroactive application of the amendment.").
166. See id.
167. Id. at 1375-76. The court concluded the first step of the analysis by declaring that the
challenger to retroactivity,
must do more than merely point to the presumption against retroactive application as a
counterweight .. . . [T]he presumption should operate only when, looking at all the
pertinent factors, we fail to detect the legislative intent. Given the .. .letter and the
absence of conflicting indicia, we cannot hold that "it is impossible to ascertain the
legislative intent." We conclude, therefore, that the Legislature intended [the statute] to
apply retroactively.
Id. (citations omitted).
A simple summary of the rule was presented in a footnote following this discussion. It stated,
"the presumption against retroactivity is dispositive until such time as other evidence permits us to
deduce the Legislature's intent, and is completely irrelevant thereafter." Id. at 1376 n.6. The intent

Once a court determines that the statute under examination is intended

to apply retroactively, it then must determine whether retroactive application
of the statute is constitutional. 168 There must be a vested property right for
the constitutional question to be relevant.' 69

Consequently, the Bouquet

court briefly examined the character of the wife's property interests. 170 It
held that, because property is characterized at the time of its acquisition, the
wife's interest in her husband's income vested when the husband earned the
money. 171 Therefore, retroactive application of the statute deprived the wife
of a vested right in72a portion of her husband's income by classifying it as his
separate property. 1
Once property rights are characterized as vested, they cannot be

constitutionally impaired by state action unless such action is within the
state's police power to protect a sufficiently significant state interest.' 73 The
Bouquet court utilized the same state interest as did the Addison court to

determination lead the court to its next issue. Id. at 1376.
168. Id. The constitutional analysis turns on whether there has been a deprivation of a property
right. Id. The court adopted the constitutional issue posed by Addison that, "[t]he constitutional
question . . . [is] not whether a vested right is impaired by a marital property law change, but
whether such a change reasonably could be believed to be sufficiently necessary to the public
welfare as to justify the impairment." Id. (quoting Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 902 (Cal.
1965)); see also supra note 126.
169. The legislature can impair non-vested rights without running afoul of the constitution. In re
Marriage of Hilke, 841 P.2d 891, 896 (Cal. 1992) ("[Plaintiff]'s interest was not vested but was,
rather, contingent on his surviving his former wife. We need not engage in extensive analysis of the
Bouquet... factors as they might apply in this situation, because in the absence of a vested interest,
retroactivelegislationdoes not violate dueprocess.") (emphasis added).
170. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376.
171. Id. This court defines the term "vested" as the condition of property rights "that are not
subject to a condition precedent." Id. at 1376 n.7. This definition of the term is fairly uniform. See
In re Marriage of Hilke, 841 P.2d at 897. Webster's Dictionary defines "vest" as "to grant or endow
with a particular authority, right, or property." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "vested,"
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/vested (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). But see Loop v. State, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 909, 913 (Ct. App. 1966); Knutson, supra note 142, at 267; Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 696 (1960);
Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REv. 231, 245-48 (1927). The term
"vested" has uniformly been used to describe rights which the court was not permitted to impair with
retroactive legislation.
172. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376. In other words, the wife had a vested community property
interest in the husband's income the moment he earned it under the prior statute. Id. Applying the
new statute retrospectively effectively changed that characterization at the time it was earned to
separate property. Id. The reclassification thereby took vested property rights from the wife. Id.
Had the question been answered in the negative (i.e. that the wife had no vested interest), the
constitutional discussion would be over. Id. If there is no vested property right, the statute may be
applied retroactively without worry. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 897.
173. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376. Significantly sufficient state interests include "the health, safety,
morals and general well being of the people." Id.; see also Addison, 399 P.2d at 897; In re Marriage
of Fabian, 715 P.2d 253, 259 (Cal. 1986) ("In the interest of finality, uniformity and predictability,
retroactivity of marital property statutes should be reserved for those rare instances when such
disruption is necessary to promote a significantly important state interest.").
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justify the impairment of the vested property right at issue. 1 74 It also
provided a list of factors to help in determining whether a retroactive statute
impairs due process. 175 Accordingly, the court stated, "[t]he state's interest
in the equitable dissolution of the marital relationship supports [the] use of
the [state's] police power to abrogate rights in marital property that derived
from the patently unfair former law."' 1 76 Because the state interest was
considerably high and the unconstitutionality of the former law clear, 1 77 the
Bouquet court decided that the legislation could be applied retroactively
despite the impairment of the wife's vested property rights. 178
iii. Application ofJoint Tenancy Statutes
Vested property rights also come into issue with property held in joint
tenancy. Concurrent estates, including joint tenancy, have caused California
courts constant aggravation. 179 Upon dissolution of marriage or death of one
of the partners, courts often could not discern whether couples intended to
hold titled property in joint tenancy-the default form of title for many
banks and real estate companies. 0 The common law approach viewed the

174. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1377. As summarized by the Bouquet court, "The state's paramount
interest in the equitable distribution of marital property upon dissolution of the marriage, we
concluded, justified the impairment of the husband's vested property rights." Id. (emphasis added).
175. See supra note 156. This is the area in the Bouquet analysis where Matsumura's "fairness
concerns" fit. Id.
176. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1378.
177. Id. at 1373.
Although the constitutionality of [the] former [law] is not directly before us in this case,
we can nonetheless observe that it would be subject to strong constitutional challenge.
Prior to the amendment, [the law] blatantly discriminated against the husband during
periods of separation: the earnings of the wife were her separate property while those of
the husband belonged to the community. It seems doubtful that the state could conjure a
rational relation between this unequal treatment and any legitimate state interest. It is
even less likely that the state could sustain the greater showing required by our
recognition that sex based classifications are inherently suspect.
Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 1378; see also Spangler, supra note 108, at 353 ("The [Bouquet] court held that
the retroactive application of [the law] was necessary to correct the 'rank injustice' of the preceding
law ...").
179. See infra note 180.
180. For an idea of the history of confusion caused by concurrent estates and their application, see
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2580(b) (West 2006). This portion of the statute declares:
The methods provided by case and statutory law have not resulted in consistency in the
treatment of spouses' interests in property they hold in joint title, but rather, have created
confusion as to which law applies to property at a particular point in time, depending on
the form of title, and, as a result, spouses cannot have reliable expectations as to the
characterization of their property and the allocation of the interests therein, and attorneys

759

written title as an effective rebuttal of the general community property
presumption; thus, property acquired during marriage was presumed to be
community property absent title indicating a different form. 18'
Recognizing the nightmare courts experienced in applying the law to
cases where most parties did not understand the implications of the form of
title,182 the legislature passed California Civil Code section 4800.1.183 This
section classified any jointly held property as community property for
purposes of distribution at divorce, regardless of the form of ownership
indicated on the title. 184 Moreover, the law created explicit retroactivity.185

cannot reliably advise their clients regarding applicable law.
Id.; see also In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 360-61 (Cal. 1985) (citing the Senate Journal
which reprinted the California Law Revision Commission's Report Concerning AB 26). The report
cited in Buol shed light on the reasoning for giving retroactive effect to the Bill. Id. at 361. As the
court explained:
The Senate was concerned that because marital partners often use community property
funds to acquire assets taken in joint tenancy without knowledge of the legal distinctions
between the two, and the courts are without jurisdiction to divide joint tenancy property
upon dissolution, absent section [2581]'s community property presumptions, the courts
may be precluded from making 'the most sensible disposition of all the assets of the
parties.' ... [T]he Senate wanted to extend the presumption to all marital property taken
in joint tenancy because, 'spouses frequently hold substantial amounts of their wealth in
joint tenancy form, including bank accounts, stocks, and other real property.'
Id.
The court further illuminated the historical problem with concurrent estates when it explained:
"The Legislature and the courts have long been aware that 'husbands and wives take property in
joint tenancy without legal counsel but primarily because deeds prepared by real estate brokers,
escrow companies and by title companies are usually presented to the parties in joint tenancy
form... "' Id. (citing In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285, 288 (Cal. 1980)).
181. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2006) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, all
property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while
domiciled in this state is community property.").
182. See supra note 180.
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (1992) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2580-81 (1994)).
Since there is no substantive change between the old civil code section 4800.1 and the current
version in the family code, any further reference to the old section will be amended to refer to CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2581. See In re Marriage of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1350 n.l (Cal. 1995) ("Section[]
4800.1 . . . [is] continued in Family Code sections 2580 .[and] 2581 . . .without substantive
change.").
184. Couples could still hold property in joint tenancy. California Family Code section 2581
states:
For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of
the parties, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form... is presumed
to be community property. This presumption . . . may be rebutted by either of the
following:
(a) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by which the
property is acquired that the property is separate property and not community property.
(b) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is separate
property.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West 2006).
185. See Buol, 705 P.2d at 356 (quoting Section 4 of California AB 26: "' [t]his act applies to the
following proceedings: [] (a) Proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1984[;] [] (b)
7A
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The law's effect was to retroactively change property ownership-thus
creating the ideal environment for constitutional challenges.
The California courts faced their first constitutional challenge to the law
in 1985 with In re Marriage of Buol. 186 The Buols married in 1943 and
remained together until 1977.87 The husband worked during the course of
the marriage until 1970 when he was fired. 188 Following termination, the
husband entered into a prolonged period of unemployment wherein he
collected social security benefits. 189 The wife began working in 1954 doing
She was
miscellaneous housekeeping and caring for the elderly.' 90
employed full-time as a nursing attendant in 1959 and remained so up
through the divorce proceedings.' 9' All earnings from her employment were
kept separate from any other source of income in the household.' 9 She did
so with her husband's consent and in 1963 used the money to purchase a
home. 193 She made all of the mortgage, tax, and maintenance payments on
94
the property out of her separate account; the husband contributed nothing. 1
Upon divorce, the husband claimed a one-half interest in the value of the
home as community property.' 95 The wife countered, alleging the couple
had an oral agreement that both her earnings and the home were her separate

Proceedings commenced before January 1, 1984, to the extent [those] proceedings ... are not yet
final on January I, 1984."'). A similar provision applies to the section as added to the Family Code.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2580 (West 2006). This antecedent to section 2581 acts as an introduction to the
law and provides some context for its purpose and weight. After discussing the confusion caused by
prior laws and the significant state interest in "provid[ing] uniformly and consistently for the
standard of proof in establishing the character of property acquired by spouses during marriage in
joint title form," the section speaks to its intended application. § 2580(a). It reads:
[A] compelling state interest exists to provide for uniform treatment of property. Thus,
former Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 of the Civil Code .. .and as continued in Sections
2581 and 2640 of this code, apply to all property held in joint title regardless of the date
of acquisition of the property or the date of any agreement affecting the character of the
property, and those sections apply in all proceedings commenced on or after January 1,
1984.
§ 2580(c) (emphasis added).
186. 705 P.2d 354 (Cal. 1985).
187. Id. at 355.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court's recantation of the facts provides indications of the husband's character. Id.
at 355-56.
It refers to him as an alcoholic and compulsive gambler. Id.
190. Id. at 355.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.Facts provided in the case indicate that the property increased in value from a purchase
price of $17,500 in 1963 to $167,500 in 1985 when the case was decided. Id. at 356.
194. Id.
195. Id.

property. 96 She corroborated her contentions through personal testimony
and that of other family members.' 97 They testified that the husband

publicly acknowledged his wife was the sole owner of the home, claiming
that he did not want any responsibility.' 98
The trial court ruled that the parties had an enforceable oral agreement

and distributed the property accordingly.

99

The husband appealed, during

which Civil Code section 4800.1 was enacted. 20 0 The law was created to
apply retroactively, 20 ' which created an issue: whether "legislation requiring
a writing to prove . . .that property taken in joint tenancy form is the

separate property of one spouse [may]
20 2 constitutionally be applied to cases
pending before its effective date[.],,
The Buol court began its analysis the same way the Bouquet court
had-by determining the legislative intent on retroactivity. 20 3 However, the

Buol court had a much easier time because the statutory language was
explicit. 20 4 Despite its determination that the Legislature intended the law to
apply retroactively, the court noted, "[1]egislative intent .. .is only one
prerequisite to retroactive application of a statute .... [I]t remains for us to

determine whether retroactivity is barred by constitutional constraints. '2

5

From this point on, the court relied on Bouquet and Addison to decide
whether the enactment of the statute deprived the wife of a vested property
interest without due process. 206 First, tec
the court recognized that the wife had
a vested separate property interest in the home at the time of trial. 20 7 The

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
202. Buol, 705 P.2d at 355. The court later noted that, because the other property in the marriage
was distributed prior to the appeal, "[tihe sole issue at trial was the status of the home as separate or
community property." Id. at 356.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 357.
205. Id. This court posited three ways in which a retroactively applied statute could be
unconstitutional: (1)it could be an ex post facto law; (2) it could deprive a person of a vested right
without due process of law; or (3) it could impair the obligations of a contract. Id. (citing Rosefield
Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 47 P.2d 716, 717 (Cal. 1935); San Bemardino County v. Indus. Acc.
Com., 20 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1933)).
206. Buol, 705 P.2d at 360-62.
207. Id.The court used the definition of "vested" handed down by the Bouquet court, "'to
describe property rights that are not subject to a condition precedent."' Id. at 357 n.6 (citing In re
Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Cal. 1976)). With this idea in hand, it also relied on the
precedential holding that "' [t]he status of property as community or separate is normally determined
at the time of its acquisition."' Id. at,357 (quoting Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376). Absent any other
indications, the home purchased by the wife would be community property. See supra note 79.
However, the Buol court also utilized the "long recognized" principal of marital
transmutations. Buol, 705 P.2d at 357. The principal is that 'separate property ...[might] be
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statute impaired this right by requiring a written instrument to prove the
couple's intent to make the home the wife's separate property.2 °8 Despite
the clear infringement of a vested property interest, the court recognized that
the law could be constitutional if "reasonably necessary to protect the health,
safety, morals and general welfare of the people. 2 °9
Regardless of the Buol court's heavy reliance on Bouquet and Addison,
it was unable to reach a result consistent with those cases. 2'0 The court
identified the state interest supporting the impairment of vested rights in the
two precedent cases as the "'equitable dissolution of the marital
relationship." ' ' 21 Addison and Bouquet justified the retroactive application
of the law in question as necessary to cure the "'rank injustice.' that resulted
from the previous law.212 In this case, however, the court was unable to find
a similar wrong which would substantiate retroactive application of the
statute.2t 3 The holding stated that retroactive application of the writing
requirement, "vitiates [the couple's] oral agreement, which the trial court
found to be valid and enforceable under existing law, and imposes a new
214
writing requirement with which [the wife] cannot possibly comply."
application of the statute was held
Consequently, retroactive
unconstitutional.2 15

converted into community property or vice versa at any time by oral agreement between the
spouses."' Id. (quoting Woods v. Sec.-First Nat'l Bank, 299 P.2d 657, 659 (Cal. 1956)); see also
CAL. FAM. CODE § 852 (requiring a writing to effect a valid transmutation; but "not apply[ing] to or
affect[ing] a transmutation of property made before January 1, 1985"). Thus, the separate character
of the home hinged entirely on the validity of the agreement between the spouses. In a note, the
court discussed the husband's contention that no such agreement existed. Buol, 705 P.2d at 357 n.7.
Yet the court was confined by precedent as to its ability to review the trial court's factual findings.
Id. Additionally, the court provided a litany of witness testimony that directly controverted the
husband's claim. Id. Since the trial court's conclusion concerning the existence of an agreement
was supported by substantial evidence, that determination could not be disturbed. Id.
208. Id. at 359.
209. Id. at 360. The court relies on the Bouquet factors for determining whether retroactive laws
violate due process. Id. They also affirm the position that, "[w]here 'retroactive application is
necessary to subserve a sufficiently important state interest,' the inquiry need proceed no further."
Id. (quoting Bouquet, 456 P.2d at 1376).
210. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
211. Buol, 705 P.2d at 360 (quoting Bouquet, 456 P.2d at 1377-78).
212. Id.
213. Id. ("No such compelling reason exists for applying section [2581] retroactively. Section
[2581] cures no 'rank injustice' in the law and, in the retroactivity context, only minimally serves the
state interest in equitable division of marital property, at tremendous cost to the separate property
owner.").
214. Id. at 362.
215. Id.
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Confusion in joint tenancy presumptions was not settled with the
conclusion of Buol. In re Marriage of Hilke came before the California

Supreme Court seven years after Buol and carved out a specific factual
situation wherein retrospective application of section 2581216 was
constitutional. 217
The facts leading up to the divorce in Hilke are
substantially similar to the facts in Buol. In 1955, Robert and Joyce Hilke

married.2

18

They purchased a home together in joint tenancy in 1969 and

filed for divorce twenty years later in 1989.19 At this point the similarities
end. The Hilke court bifurcated the proceedings in order to grant the

couple's divorce, but it retained jurisdiction to decide the property issues at a
later date. 220 Following the divorce decree but before any of the property
issues were decided, Mrs. Hilke died. 21

Mrs. Hilke's death was problematic because the joint tenancy statute
was created to apply to divorce proceedings

only. 22

Despite the

216. California Family Code section 2581 is the antecedent to section 4800.1. See supranote 183.
217. In re Marriage of Hilke, 841 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1992).
218. Id. at 893.
219. Id. While the chronology of events in the two cases is almost identical, one major distinction
is that in Hilke, "[n]either party contended there had been any contributions of separate property
toward purchase of the residence, and there was no claim of an agreement that the property would be
the separate property of either spouse." Id. Towards the end of the opinion, the court notes another
difference: "An additional difference between this case ... and Buol ... is that section [2581 ] was
enacted well before Mrs. Hilke filed the petition for dissolution." Id. at 897 n.4.
220. Id. at 893. Effectively, the court split the single proceeding into two distinct legal
actions-one dealing with the dissolution of the marriage and the other handling the division of
property. Id. All of this does not matter except for the fact that Mrs. Hilke died immediately after
the granting of the divorce but before the property judgment. Id. It was because of this fact that Mr.
Hilke's attempted reliance on Estate of Blair, a seemingly similar case, failed. Id. at 895.
In Blair, the wife died before the entry of judgment on the dissolution of the couple's marriage.
Estate of Blair, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629 (Ct. App. 1988). Her death effectively discontinued the
divorce proceeding. Id. at 630. The court noted, "[w]here one party dies during the pendency of a
dissolution proceeding, the court retains power to enter judgment in conformity with matters
adjudicated before the death, but cannot adjudicate unresolved issues." Id. (citing In re Marriage of
Williams, 161 Cal. Rptr. 808, 809-10 (Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added)).
Thus, the Hilke court stated that the difference in result between the two cases was merely a
temporal matter with respect to the death of the parties. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 895. "Th[e] result [in
'Blair] was correct ... [but it] does not ... dictate the identical result in the present case, since here
the trial court had dissolved the spouses' marriage before the wife's death, and had reserved its
jurisdiction to determine property issues in subsequent proceedings." Id.
221. Id. at 893. Footnote two in the opinion notes that Mrs. Hilke devised her share of the
couple's community property to her children. Id. at 893 n.2. This devise is the factor that created
problems for the couple. If the home were determined to be community property, the children would
receive the wife's half under her will and the husband would retain his one-half community property
interest. If, on the other hand, the community property presumption did not apply, "then the
presumption arising from the form of title is that the spouses were joint tenants and Mr. Hilke
consequently succeeds to the property by right of survivorship, absent a transmutation." Id. at 894.
For a brief discussion of the development of the statute in question and the problems with joint
tenancy and the older presumptions, see id. at 893-94.
222. Id. at 894. Some history of the legislation proves useful at this point. The section was
originally enacted as an amendment to former section 5110, protecting the single family residence,
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limitation,
the court resolved the issue in favor of applying the statute. 24
The application effectively extinguished half of Mr. Hilke's potential
interest in the property and solidified Mrs. Hilke's community property
interest.225 Consequently, Mr. Hilke raised the now familiar constitutional
argument-retroactive application of the statute deprived him of a vested
property right without due process of law.226
The court acknowledged the decisions in Bouquet and Buol on similar
topics, but easily distinguished the facts before it from those cases. 227 The
problem with Mr. Hilke's contention hinged on the idea of vested property
rights. As the courts in both Buol and Bouquet discussed, a vested property
right is one that is not subject to a condition precedent.228 Here, Mr. Hilke
had a survivorship interest in joint tenancy.22 9 Survivorships are necessarily
predicated on surviving the other individual in interest-here, Mrs. Hilke.23 °
Since Mr. Hilke's interest was subject to this condition precedent, it was not
vested.2 1' Thus, the court held that there was no "need [to] engage in
extensive analysis of the Bouquet-Buol factors as they might apply in this

in 1983. Id. The amendment was codified in the California Family Code as section 4800.1. Id.
Section 4800.1 expanded "the presumption regarding marital property held in joint tenancy
form... to cover all property acquired during marriage in joint tenancy form." Id. The legislature
found the interest protected by the statute to be sufficiently important to create retroactivity in a 1986
amendment. Id. Hence the issue in this case, which the court framed as, "whether the prerequisite
for [the statute's] application is met" was "whether the instant proceeding involves a division of
property upon dissolution of marriage." Id. Since the statute only applied to dissolution and
separate maintenance proceedings, Mrs. Hilke's death made application of the statute problematic.
223. Section 2581 states that it applies "[flor the purpose of division of property on dissolution of
marriage or legal separation of the parties [only]." CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West 2006). This
language expressly limits the application of the section to divorce and separation, thereby excluding
application to division of property at death.
224. Id. Had the court held against applying the statute, Mr. Hilke's one-half interest in the
property would have remained intact. See supra note 221. However, on the specific issue of Mrs.
Hilke's death, the court held that "[t]he death of one of the spouses abates a cause of action for
dissolution, but does not deprive the court of its retained jurisdiction to determine collateral property
rights if the court has previously rendered judgment dissolving the marriage." Hilke, 841 P.2d at
894.
225. See supra note 224.
226. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 895.
227. Id.at 895-97.
228. Id.at 896; see also supranote 171.
229. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 896.
230. Id. at 891. The general rule for ownership of property in joint tenancy is the automatic
application of a right of survivorship, meaning that when one tenant dies, the entire estate survives to
the remaining tenants to the exclusion of the deceased tenant's heirs. Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d
330, 334 (Cal. 1976); Estate of Mitchell, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192, 196 (Ct. App. 1999); Cole v. Cole,
294 P.2d 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
231. See supra note 171.
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situation, because in the absence of a vested interest, retroactive legislation
does not violate due process. 232
Lacking the vested interest, the court easily applied section 2581 to the
property in Hilke.233 Under that statute, the couple's home was presumed to
be community property even though the title was in joint tenancy.234 As a
result, Mrs. Hilke's one-half interest was not extinguished on her death, but
remained with her estate. 235 Thus, her will was effectuated and her one-half
interest in the home went to her children.236
Although the Hilke decision further qualified the statutory rule in
divorce proceedings, it left the law substantially the same as it was following
Bouquet and Buol. Specifically, Hilke stands for the proposition that parties
cannot successfully challenge the impairment of vested rights if their
property interests are merely contingent.237 The holding concluded the body
of jurisprudence on community property law and concurrent estates.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Community property law as applied to heterosexual married couples has
undergone extensive evolution. Within that development, a body of law
pertaining to retroactive application of statutes has emerged. 238 The passage
of the Act abruptly thrust that very same property distribution scheme on an
entirely new class of legally recognized couples. 23 9 Expanding the system's
scope will inevitably lead to confusion and litigation as couples and courts
determine exactly how the letter of the law will be interpreted.2 40 While the
above overview of retrospective community property law will likely guide
courts in their decisions, scenarios unique to domestic partnerships will
surely arise.24 1

232. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 897.
233. Id.
234. Id. The court applied the older version of the statute, section 4800.1. Id.; see also supra note
183. The court noted that the statute provided two methods of rebutting the presumption, but that
neither applied to this case. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 896.
235. Id. at 897. The practical effect of community property application was that the court ordered
the home sold and the proceeds divided between Mr. Hilke and Mrs. Hilke's beneficiaries.
236. See supra note 221.
237. Hilke, 841 P.2d at 891.
238. See supra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 74.
240. See generally Matsumura, supra note 5; Monagas, supra note 43; Gavin, supra note 5.
241. Some already have. See infra notes 257-307 and accompanying text.
/UVl
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A.

InitialChallenges-California'sDefense ofMarriageAct

In California, one such issue has already been decided under the
heading, Proposition 22.242 The initiative was voted into law in 2000 by a
majority of California voters.243 Immediate challenges arose after the
passage of the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act from those
who believed Proposition 22 preempted such an expansion of rights to nonmarried couples.

244

According to those in opposition of the Act, the new

law altered the definition of marriage that was voted on by a majority of
California citizens and subsequently placed into law. 245 The Act's
proponents claimed that the law did not affect marriage in any way.246 In
support of their position, they referred to the substantial differences between
legal marriages and legally recognized domestic partnerships that remained
even after the passage of California Family Code section 297.5.247

The California Court of Appeal eventually came down in support of the

Act in Knight v. Superior Court.2 48 The case arose out of a petition for

declaratory and injunctive relief by groups of California citizens opposing
242. California Proposition 22, commonly known as the California Defense of Marriage Act,
created California Family Code section 308.5 which provides: "Only marriage between a man and a
woman is valid or recognized in California." CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2006).

243. For a comprehensive look at the outcomes of the 2000 California election, including the
results for Proposition 22, see California Secretary of State, State Ballot Measures, available at
http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/returns/prop/00.htm (showing that 61.4 percent of California voters
approved Proposition 22).
244. See Gavin, supra note 5, at 492-93.
245. Id. Proposition 22 did not effectively change who could and could not legally marry in
California. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (1992) (formerly CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100) (providing that
the marriage contracts may only be entered into by a man and a woman; see also Assembly
Committee on Judiciary, Committee Analysis of AB 205, at 11 [hereinafter Committee Analysis]
(April 1, 2003) available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_02010250/ab_205_cfa_
20030328_132344_asmcomm.html. The Proposition was more of a preemptive strike to prevent
California from recognizing same-sex marriages that occurred in other jurisdictions. Id.
246. See Committee Analysis, supra note 245, at 12.
247. Id. The proponents of the Act cited a list of ways in which domestic partnership is different
from marriage:
It will continue to be entered into and, for many people, exited in a different way than
marriage; It may not be recognized outside of California; The federal government will
not recognize domestic partners for the 1,049 federal rights and benefits associated with
marriage, such as social security, Medicaid, and federal taxes; [and] it will not grant
same-sex couples the full social and symbolic equality of marriage.
Id. (quoting Goldberg).
248. 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005).
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the Act.249 Petitioners claimed that California Family Code section 297.5
effectively amended Proposition 22 and was, therefore, constitutionally void
without voter approval.250 The court did not agree.
First, it defined what constituted an amendment: "any change of
the scope or effect of an existing statute, whether by addition, omission,
or substitution of provisions, which does not wholly terminate its
existence ....,,21Then the court noted that Proposition 22 was intended to

prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions, not
to limit or define the rights of domestic partners.252 Since the Proposition
contained no reference to domestic partners, the court held that section 297.5
was not an amendment.253 The court further adopted respondent's position
when it used the list of differences between legal marriages and domestic
partnerships surviving the Act as a justification for its holding.254 The list

249. Id. at 689.
250. Id. Petitioners cited the California Constitution, averring that "[t]he Legislature may amend
or repeal referendum statutes. It may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that
becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits
amendment or repeal without their approval." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (emphasis added).
251. Knight, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 692-93 (citations omitted). The court also noted that, "[a] statute
which adds to or takes away from an existing statute is considered an amendment." Id. at 693.
252. Id. at 696.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 699. This was the very same list that the Act's supporters had used to justify its
existence before this litigation commenced. Those differences include:
[Domestic partners] may not file joint tax returns and their earned income is not treated
as community property for state income tax purposes, and they are not entitled to
numerous benefits provided to married couples by the federal government, such as
marital benefits relating to Social Security, Medicare, federal housing, food stamps,
veterans' benefits, military benefits, and federal employment benefit laws.
And prerequisites for the formation of domestic partnerships differ from marriage.
Persons under the age of 18 who wish to marry may do so with parental consent;
however, there is no similar provision for minors to register as domestic partners.
In addition, homosexuals must share a common residence before they can
register as domestic partners, but there is no similar limitation for persons who wish to
marry ....
In addition, the mechanisms for forming and terminating the relationships are different.
Domestic partners simply file with the Secretary of State a Declaration of Domestic
Partnership to form their legal union; but couples who want to marry must obtain a
license and participate in some form of ceremony solemnizing their marriage. Another
difference is the method for terminating a domestic partnership. [Under certain
circumstances] . . . they may terminate the relationship simply by filing with the
Secretary of State a Notice of Termination of Domestic Partnership. The dissolution of a
marriage under similar circumstances requires judicial intervention ....
Furthermore, unlike a marriage, a domestic partnership will not automatically be
recognized by other states.
Id. (citations omitted).
The court concluded that, "These factors indicate marriage is considered a more substantial
relationship and is accorded a greater stature than a domestic partnership." Id. By listing the
differences between the two groups of rights, the court clearly sides with the Act's proponents. See
supra note 247.
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bolstered the court's rationale and holding that "the Legislature has not
created a 'same-sex marriage' under the guise of another name. 255
Accordingly, the court held that California Family Code section 297.5 did
not require separate voter approval because it was not an amendment to
Proposition 22.256
B.

CurrentDomestic PartnerLitigation

Under Knight, the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act
withstood its first challenge. 57 However, there have been further challenges
to the Act's validity since Knight.258 The decisions are not directly on point
to the retroactivity problem but they do elucidate the court's reaction to
domestic partner litigation. Combined with the retroactive community
property law described in Part II supra, reasonable predictions may be made
about the court's ultimate decision when the constitutional challenge to
section 297.5 finally does arise.
The following section describes the most pertinent litigation involving
registered domestic partners and the Act. It is organized by the subject of
the litigation and the goal of the parties involved.
1. Wrongful Death and Retroactivity
Retroactive application of the Act was first discussed in terms of the
259
provision for wrongful death standing for registered domestic partners.
The plaintiff and her partner in Armijo v. Miles were in a committed
relationship for fourteen years.2 60 Although the relationship began before
the creation of the statewide domestic partner registry, its validity came into
question because of the couple's failure to register with the California
Secretary of State after the law was passed.261 Plaintiff's partner died in
2001 while under the care of the physician defendant; plaintiff attributed the
death to the defendant's malpractice.262 Nearly one year after the death,

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Knight, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 700.
Id.
See id.
See infra notes 259-307 and accompanying text.
Armijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 626.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 626.
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plaintiff brought a suit for wrongful death against the treating doctor and the
hospital where her partner passed away. 263
At the time of the death, there was no doubt that plaintiff lacked

standing to sue for wrongful death .264 However, legislation passed less than
two months after the death which unequivocally allowed domestic partners
to bring suits for the wrongful deaths of their partners. 265 The new law was
also clear in its intent to apply retroactively. 266 In 2004, another bill passed
which allowed "a cause of action for wrongful death to proceed. . . although
a Declaration of Domestic Partnership was not filed with the Secretary of
State, if other specified requirements are met., 267 Taken together, the bills
created a window of opportunity for the plaintiff to sue despite the couple's
failure to register with the State.268

Armijo is distinguishable from other modem domestic partner litigation
in that the constitutional challenge comes from the non-domestic partner
defendant.269 Defendant, decedent's physician, argued that she had a vested

right in being free from litigation at the time plaintiffs partner died. 270 Her
argument continued that allowing plaintiff wrongful death standing after the
enactment of legislation unconstitutionally impaired her vested rights.27'

263. Id.
264. Id. at 628. In 2001, the wrongful death statute in California did not include domestic partners
as persons with standing to sue. The passage of AB 25 amended section 377.60 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure to include domestic partners. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West
2006).
265. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. AB 25, although passed in 2001, did not become
effective until January 1, 2002. A.B. 0025, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
266. This court claims that since subsection (d) of the wrongful death statute was not amended
following the enactment of AB 2580, the legislature's intent was clear that the amendments were to
have retroactive application. Armijo, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 629.
267. A.B. 2580, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). The bill further stated: "A person may
maintain a cause of action pursuant to this section as a domestic partner of the decedent by
establishing the factors listed in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of subdivision (b) of section 297 of
the Family Code ....
" Id.
268. Armijo, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 631. As for a statute of limitations defense, AB 2580 specifically
provided that, "[t]he amendments made to this subdivision . . . are not intended to revive any cause
of action that has been finally adjudicated ... or as to which the applicable limitations period has
run." A.B. 2580, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). The statute of limitations on wrongful death
causes of action in California is two years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2007). Since
plaintiff brought her wrongful death action only one year after the death of her partner, the statute of
limitations defense had no bearing on the case. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
269. Armijo, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
270. Id.
271. Id. In addition to the due process contention, defendant also posed constitutional challenges
under the separation of powers, equal protection, and the prohibition on bills of attainder. Id. The
defendants' arguments were novel. In cases where the law provides a cause of action for wrongful
death, that right accrues at the time of death of the party in question. Id. Once any right has vested,
it cannot be constitutionally impaired absent due process of law. Id. (citing Wexler v. City of Los
Angeles, 243 P.2d 868, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)). Defendants argued basic fairness dictated that the
opposite of this proposition should also hold true. Id. Consequently, defendant argued, the
aforementioned principle provided her with a right not to be sued which vested upon the death of
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The court did not agree. According to the opinion, there was no right of
defendants to "have the class of potential plaintiffs frozen as of the time of
death.,.2 72 The court disposed of the defendant's constitutional claim
because they failed to show that a right even existed.273
,2.

Scope of the Statute-Domestic Partners Who Want to Choose

Defining the class of persons able to bring constitutional arguments as
the court did in Armijo was an initial step in cementing the Act's application.
But, as this section will show, introducing and effecting legislation is merely
the first step in changing the law. Individual fact patterns introduce
questions that were not previously contemplated and help to define
legislative scope. The grant of new rights to domestic partners has been no
different. In re Rabin2 74 helped define the Act's scope in a 2005 bankruptcy
action involving two registered domestic partners.27 5
The facts of the case are as follows: The couple purchased a home
together in 1995 which they shared as their common residence.276 In 2000,
just after the creation of the domestic partner registry, the couple filed the

necessary papers with the

Secretary

of State to effectuate

their

plaintiff's partner because, when the death occurred, the law granted no such right. Id.
272. Id. It did not help defendants' case that they were unable to provide any controlling
precedent which validated their argument. See id. Additionally, the court held that the amendments
to the current law "[did] not change the legal definition of negligence, the standard by which liability
is addressed, or the character of defendants' acts or omissions." Id.
Although the court did not explicitly state that constitutional challenges in this arena would be
limited to domestic partners, the implication was evident. Ancillary parties, those indirectly affected
by the changes in the domestic partnership laws, would have a hard time finding success in the
argument that they had a vested right to reliance on the state of the law prior to the amendments.
For a more traditional approach to constitutionality and the retroactive effect of the wrongful death
amendments, see Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 820 (Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that the state's significant interest in promoting family relationships by giving
rights to domestic partners was sufficient to overcome a constitutional challenge to retroactive
application of the wrongful death amendments).
273. Armijo, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 632. Ultimately, the court decided only the limited issue of
"whether plaintiff stated a cause of action for wrongful death," in plaintiff's favor. Id. at 638. It
held that "AB 2580 simply establishes that the right to sue for wrongful death belongs to registered
domestic partners ... except that for deaths occurring prior to January 1, 2002, [standing] to sue for
wrongful death also belongs to nonregistered surviving domestic partners who, like plaintiff, can
satisfy six specific criteria." Id. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of dismissal and
remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to allow defendants time to amend their
answers. Id.
274. 336 B.R. 459 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 460.

partnership.277 The relationship endured through 2003 when the Act was
passed. 78 In August 2005, the couple filed separate bankruptcy actions;
each claimed a fifty-percent interest in their home and a $75,000 homestead
exemption. 27 9 Because a single-exemption rule under California law applied
for married couples claiming a homestead exemption,28 ° the issue28 1was
whether the Act made this rule equally applicable to domestic partners.
The couple argued they were entitled to separate homestead exemptions
because their domestic partner registration was not akin to marriage.282 In
light of the Act's mandate that domestic partners have the "same rights ...
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law," as married couples, the
argument was self-serving and bordering on frivolous.283 Responding to the
rather obvious counter-argument, the couple claimed that even though the
Act subjected domestic partners to many of the same obligations as married
couples, they remained unmarried.284 Essentially, the couple attempted to
choose when the Act should apply and when it should not.
According to the opinion, the couple's arguments were wholly
unpersuasive because the intention of the Act was clear. 285 The law directed

277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. A homestead law is, "[a] statute exempting a homestead from execution or judicial sale
for debt .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (8th ed. 2004). The homestead is defined as, "[t]he
house ... occupied by a person or family as a residence." Id. Under the California Code of Civil
Procedure, if the "debtor or spouse ... is ... a member of a family unit, and there is at least one
member of the family unit who owns no interest in the homestead or whose only interest in the
homestead is a community property interest with the judgment debtor," the exemption is limited to
$75,000. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730(a)(2) (West 2006). Hence the amount claimed by each
of the domestic partners. Despite the statutory language, the bankruptcy trustee acted according to
the generally accepted single-exemption rule, selling the property and splitting a single $75,000
exemption in half, providing each party with $37,500. Rabin, 336 B.R. at 460.
280. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 703.110, 704.710(b)-(c), 704.730 (West 2006).
Section
703.110(a) proclaims:
The exemptions provided by this chapter . . . apply to all property that is subject to
enforcement of a money judgment .... The fact that one or both spouses are judgment
debtors under the judgment or that property sought to be applied to the satisfaction of the
judgment is separate or community does not increase or reduce the number or amount of
the exemptions.
§ 703.110(a). The court further acknowledged that "[w]hen both spouses are entitled to a homestead
exemption, the exemption is apportioned between the spouses on the basis of their proportionate
interest in the homestead." Rabin, 336 B.R. at 460 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.740(b)
(West 2007)).
281. Rabin, 336 B.R. at 460.
282. Id. at 461. The rationale for their argument came from the California Code of Civil
Procedure that states that the single exemption rule applies only if the debtors are married. Id.
(citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 703.110 (West 2007)).
283. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
284. Rabin, 336 B.R. at 461.
285. Id. The court noted that "[tihat the Legislature used the word 'spouse' rather than 'married'
to achieve its goal of giving registered domestic partners the same rights and duties as married
couples does not reflect any intent to limit the broad scope of the Domestic Partners Act." Id.
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that domestic partners were subject to the duties of married couples.2 86
Therefore, there was no reason that the single homestead exemption rule
should not apply to registered domestic partners.287 Rabin was the first in
what will eventually be a line of cases defining the scope of the Act. The
court strictly applied the words of the statute, leaving little doubt of the
Act's effect.
Another test to the limits of the Act's application came from Velez v.
Smith.288 Unlike Rabin, the appellant in Velez argued for application of the
Act. 289 The couple first filed simultaneous domestic partner registrations
with the City and County of San Francisco in 1994.290 Two years later the
couple re-registered and had a "public commitment ceremony" modeled
after a traditional marriage. 29' From that point until the time of the decision,
the couple held themselves out as committed domestic partners.292 Even
though the couple appeared to desire all the accoutrements of a legal union,
they never registered their domestic partnership with the California
Secretary of State.293
In late 2004, respondent filed a "Notice for Ending a Domestic
Partnership., 294 After receiving the notice, appellant responded by filing a
petition for dissolution of domestic partnership in the family law courts.2 95
She claimed that "registration in accordance with state law [wa]s not a []
prerequisite to" the application of the Act and prayed that the court
retroactively apply the Act's amendments to her relationship.296 Effectively,

286. Id.
287. Id. The court concluded that the application of the rule to domestic partners was justified by
the "broad language of the [Act] and the broad statement of legislative purpose accompanying [it]."
Id.
288. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Ct. App. 2006).
289. Id. at 648.
290. Id. at 644.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 645. The opinion noted that the couple "lived and purchased real property
together[;]... purchased and shared ownership of personal property, including automobiles, pension
benefits, insurance coverage and benefits, and family pets[;] .. . [and] were jointly responsible for
household living expenses, and maintained joint bank accounts in which they commingled funds."
Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. The appellant, "requested dissolution of a domestic partnership ....
division of the
accumulated partnership property, termination of jurisdiction to award support to respondent, and
attorney fees." Id. She claimed that the termination of her domestic partnership should be governed
by the rules espoused under the Act. Id. at 647.
296. Id. Appellant's argument rested on retroactive application. She did "not dispute that as a
domestic partner, prior to the 2003 amendment to the law she had no statutory right to bring a
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appellant made the same argument posed in Rabin; she wanted to define the
scope of the Act's application to best fit her circumstances. 297 The trial
court did not agree with appellant and dismissed the petition for dissolution
for lack of jurisdiction.295
On appeal the court reviewed the history of domestic partner legislation
and the requirements of the Act. 2 99 The court found that the Act explicitly
required couples to register in order to garner the law's benefits. 300 This
finding pushed appellant's relationship outside the Act's reach and
consequently beyond the family court's jurisdiction.3 '
Additionally,
because the "Notice for Ending a Domestic Partnership" was filed in
November of 2004, it nullified any argument for the Act's application.30 2
Appellant's failure to secure family court jurisdiction led to her second
contention: the law should be applied to her case retroactively. 0 3 The court
agreed that the Act applied retroactively, but dismissed appellant's claim
because she did not meet the requirements that the law expressly placed on
those wishing it to govern their affairs. 3 4 Constitutional questions were

dissolution action in the family law court." Id. at 648.
This situation can be distinguished from Armijo, See supra notes 260-73 and accompanying
text. In that case, the court held that the domestic partner plaintiff could benefit from the amended
domestic partnership laws despite the couples failure to register with the Secretary of State. See
supranote 273 and accompanying text. The different outcome was justified by the specific language
of the statute which provided that the couples need not register to obtain standing in a wrongful
death suit.
297. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text. If the Act applied, community property laws
would provide appellant a one-half share in her partner's property. Otherwise, the separate character
of each partner's property would not be disturbed. The court recognized appellant's plight as a
desire to "receive the benefits of the amendments to the domestic partnership laws, but avoid the
registration requirements." Velez, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654.
298. Id. at 645.
299. Id. at 648-50.
300. Id. at 650. The court acknowledged that "'[u]nder the Domestic Partner Act, domestic
partners, like [flormally married couples, have been granted significant rights and bear important
responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by couples who cohabit or who have not
registered as domestic partners."' Id. (quoting Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d
1212, 1222 (Cal. 2005)) (quotations omitted).
301. The court noted that the couple's repeated registration with San Francisco did nothing to
mitigate their complete failure to register with the state. Id. at 651. "Local law and the state
Domestic Partner Act are not equivalent; compliance with one is not compliance with the other." Id.
302. Id. at 652. At that time, domestic partnerships were subject to termination if one of the
partners mailed notice to the other. Respondent sent the notice to appellant after the Secretary of
State sent notice to domestic partners regarding the changes in domestic partnership law. Even
though the couple never registered with the state, the partnership was successfully terminated prior
to the enactment of the amendments. Id.
303. Id. at 653. Appellant's argument was that, since her relationship with respondent began
before the effective date of the Act, the law should apply retroactively in order to "give[] practical
effect to the mutual promises of the parties related to their domestic partnership." Id. at 653-54
(quotations omitted).
304. Id. at 654. Absent the registration problem, this case was poised to be the case that analysts
have been waiting for; and the court recognizes this fact. See infra notes 313-18 and accompanying
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never reached in this case because the parties did not correctly follow the
procedures which would have provided those rights.3 °5 Once again the court
strictly construed the scope of the Act as falling directly in the plain meaning
of the words used in the statute. The court's holding was clear: if a couple
wants their relationship to fall under the Act, they should follow the Act's
requirements.306
IV.

IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE-FUTURE TRENDS

Creation of new rights unavoidably generates questions about the
application and scope of those rights. The Domestic Partner Rights and
Responsibilities Act, merely five years old (effective for only three), has
already seen lawsuits challenging its applicability and pushing its outer
limits. Perhaps the largest area of speculation arises from the Act's
retroactive application.30 7
Since the domestic partner registry opened
January 1, 2000 and the Act became effective on January 1, 2005, there is a
five-year period of questionable application.308
Imposition of the community property scheme is central to the
constitutional debate because of its potentially large implications.30 9 As in

text. Had the couple registered their domestic partnership with the State of California, the court says
that it "would have no difficulty in applying the new law to their previously existing and registered
partnership, as the [Act] intends." Velez, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654.
305. The court did come to a conclusion about vested rights. However, it was not the typical
analysis we are used to seeing at this point. The court held that, "[a]ppellant has no vested rights to
proceed with dissolution of a domestic partnership that was not properly registered .... " Velez, 48
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654 (emphasis added). Recognizing that the parties may have other recourse under
the rules that existed before the enactment of the Act, specifically contractual rights, the court did
not rule out any discussion of vested rights. It simply put to rest the idea that parties can use
retroactivity arguments to make the Act apply to all domestic partner situations regardless of
compliance with the law's requirements.
306. Id. at 655.
307. See supranote 12.
308. Matsumura, supra note 5, at 197. Registration with the Secretary of State is a prerequisite to
considerations of retroactivity under the Act. See supra notes 288-307 and accompanying text.
309. In one example from Bill Harper's article in the East Bay Express, a lesbian couple filed for
divorce after registering their domestic partnership with the Secretary of State. Harper, supra note 5.
One of the individuals was a real estate agent earning upwards of a quarter million dollars annually.
Id. The other partner was an animal control officer and, while it is a noble profession, she clearly
was not matching her partner's income. Id. In the divorce proceedings, the animal control officer
demanded spousal support. Id. Although the real estate agent was abhorred by her former partner's
lawsuit for support, the couple ended up settling out of court for an undisclosed amount. Id.
Another example from the same article involved a wealthy financial adviser and a college
student. Id. The student not only sued for support, but also for a community property share in the
home the couple shared together, worth well over one million dollars. Id. This was all despite the
fact that the partnership lasted only fifteen months, and the wealthier partner had made the half

the many precedent cases dealing with amendments to the community
property laws, disadvantaged parties will categorically argue that retroactive
application of the law impairs their vested property rights without due
process of law. 3'0 After all, there is unquestionably a vested right in
property acquired by an individual outside the grips of the community
property scheme. t '
Forcing a one-half share for the less financially
endowed partner may well be an infringement of that constitutional right.
Many potential areas for litigation arise from the California community
property system. However, this article's scope restricts itself to property
distribution upon dissolution. California courts have yet to hear the case
which would determine the Act's constitutionality. This part will attempt,
through the use of hypothetical situations and a modified precedential fact
pattern, to predict the likely outcome of such cases.
A.

Altering Velez v. Smith-Creatingthe Perfect Case

Velez v. Smith3 12 was almost the perfect case.31 3 Recall the facts of
Velez: a homosexual couple, who registered their partnership with the city
and county but never with the state, terminates their partnership. 1 4 The
court refused to apply California community property law in a judicially
supervised dissolution proceeding because the couple did not properly
register. 3" However, the court explicitly stated that it would
have had no
31 6
problem doing so had the couple met the Act's prerequisites.
Imagine Velez and Smith had registered their partnership with the
Secretary of State as required under the California Family Code section 297.
The court claimed that it would have had "no difficulty" applying
community property laws to the distribution of the couple's property had
they done so. 317 But would it have been that easy?
Forecasting the outcome of such a case requires the creation of new
facts based upon the following assumptions. First, the key assumption
allowing for this analysis is that the couple registered their domestic
partnership with the California Secretary of State, following all the
procedural requirements provided under the California Family Code, on or
shortly after January 1, 2000. Second, for illustrative purposes, assume that

million dollar down payment on the house out of her employment bonus. Id. This case also settled,
and the wealthier partner paid the student's legal fees. Id.
310. See supra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 171.
312. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (2006).
313. Id.
314. See supra notes 290-95 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 301.
316. Id.
317.
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one partner, Smith, had a job which paid her a handsome salary. 318 Third,
assume that the other partner, Velez, did not have such employment.3t 9
From this point, the case begins as it actually did with Velez filing a petition
for dissolution of domestic partnership in the family courts.32 ° The couple
purchased real and personal property throughout the course of their
321

partnership and commingled their separate funds in joint bank accounts.

Yet, in the interest of simplicity, we shall make one final assumption: all

property and joint accounts acquired by the couple were acquired after
January 1, 2000.322 To summarize, a California same-sex couple registers

their domestic partnership in 2000, commingles both personal and real
property, and seeks dissolution in early 2005.

318. In fact, we know that the respondent, Krista Smith, was an employee of the San Francisco
Fire Department. See Arthur S. Leonard, Leonard Link, Gays on the Outside Looking In?, http://
newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2006/09/gays-onjthe out.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2007). The 2007 median salary of San Francisco Fire Department employees was $45,513.
Salary.com, Salary Wizard, http://swz.salary.com/salarywizard/layoutscripts/swzl-matchjob.asp?
searchtextvalue=Firefighter&zipcode=94104&x=0&y=0 (click on "Base Salary Range") (last visited
Jan. 27, 2007). With overtime pay, most make substantially more.
Additionally, same-sex households average a higher income than their heterosexual married
counterparts. According to the United States Census Bureau, the median household income for
married couples in 2005 was $66,067. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR &
CHERYL HILL LEE, INCOME,

POVERTY, AND HEALTH

INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED

STATES: 2005 6 (United States Census Bureau, 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2006pubs/p60-23 I.pdf. Conversely, the average household income of same-sex households, as
measured by the 2000 census, was $72,122. Gaydemographics.org, Same Sex Couples A-Z,
http://www.gaydemographics.org/USA/USA-A-Z.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007). Thus, assuming
that significant financial accumulations could be at stake is not overly speculative.
319. While Ms. Velez's employment status was not disclosed, the case did evidence the fact that
Smith claimed Velez as a dependent so that she would be able to take advantage of Smith's fire
department health benefits when she became ill. Velez, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 645; see also Leonard,
supra note 319. It would be safe to assume that Ms. Velez did not have independent health benefits.
Assuming that Velez's employment was therefore financially inferior to Smith's is purely for the
sake of debate but perhaps not overly attenuated. The constitutional argument below further
assumes that, since Smith brought most of the money to the relationship, most property acquired by
the couple was acquired with Smith's earnings. See infra notes 328-70 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 295. Dates are of supreme importance in this analysis because they define the
outer limits of the retroactivity period. Velez actually filed her amended petition, which requested
the court supervised dissolution, on January 31, 2005. Velez, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 645.
321. Id.
322. While this is undoubtedly false (the couple began their relationship in 1989), this assumption
allows us to maximize the interests at stake in the retroactivity issue without substantially damaging
the reality of the situation. Thus, the hypothetical creates the ideal factual scenario to test the
constitutional limits of retroactive application of California's community property laws to the
termination of registered domestic partnerships.
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1. Property Distribution
When the above case hits the court, what does the financially
advantaged partner (Smith) stand to lose? If California community property
law is applied to the relationship, the general community property
presumption would guide the court's distribution of the couple's property. 3

Thus, "all property, real or personal, wherever situated" acquired by either
partner after the date of registration would be presumed to be the property of
both.324 Upon acquisition of community property, each member of the

community immediately would have a one-half interest in that property. 5
Thus, here, Velez would already own one-half of any property that the
couple acquired after January 1, 2000, regardless of how it was attained. 2 6
If the cases of legally married spouses discussed above32 7 are any
indication, the next step would be a constitutional argument by Smith. As of
the time the property was acquired, between January 1, 2000 to December
31, 2004, the law provided that it was the separate property of the person
acquiring it. 328 Registration of the domestic partnership in 2000 had no
effect on either partner's property rights at that time. Thus, to the extent

Smith's rights in property were acquired with her earnings, and they were
not contingent upon anything, they would be vested. 9 Under both the
California and United States Constitutions, legislation cannot be enacted
which impairs a vested property interest without due process of law.33 °

Smith's argument would be the now familiar constitutional challenge:
applying community property laws retroactively, effectively giving Velez a

one-half interest in everything Smith acquired, was an unconstitutional
impairment of her vested property interests. 331

The analysis for such constitutional claims in community property law
comes from Bouquet.33 1 Under Bouquet's two-step analysis, the court would

323. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2006) (providing for the general community property
presumption).
324. Id.
325. SeeCAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 2006).
326. This statement necessarily presumes that the property does not fit into any of the separate
property exceptions which would rebut the general community property presumption. See generally
CAL. FAM. CODE § 760. The Law Revision Commission Comments of 1993 states the basic separate
property exceptions. Id.
327. See supra notes 106-236 and accompanying text.
328. This inference is derived from earlier California law which did not apply community
property law to unmarried couples prior to the creation of the domestic partner registry. Therefore,
the law that would apply would be the same as that for any other unmarried cohabitants.
329. See supra note 171.
330. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (2006) (stating that "[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating, "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
331. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
332. See generally In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976).
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first have to determine if the Legislature intended the Act to apply
retroactively. 33 3 This determination is made with the general presumption
against retroactivity in close view. 334 In this case, Velez would have
no problem rebutting the general presumption against retroactivity because
Thus, the
statute
expressly declares retroactive intent.335
the
constitutional analysis continues since the Legislature unmistakably intended
the Act to apply to situations such as the hypothetical.
The second step in the analysis is to determine whether or not applying
the law retrospectively violates constitutional guarantees to property.336

This portion of the analysis can be further dissected into two inquiries. First,
the court must determine whether or not the property right in question was
vested; if not, the inquiry stops. 3 37 Many of the precedent cases discussed
definitions of vested interests in their opinions. 338 The consensus among the
various opinions is that vested property interests are those that are not
subject to a condition precedent.339
Here, the property Smith acquired while registered with the State of
California as Velez's domestic partner would be treated the same as any

property acquired by unmarried cohabitants.

The lack of any legally

recognized marriage or any type of contractual agreement would leave the
property entirely in the name of the person who acquired it-in this case,
Smith. Her interest in the property was absolute at the time of acquisition
and, therefore, not subject to the occurrence of any condition. 340 Smith,
therefore, had a vested right.
Determination that Smith's property interests were vested leads us to the
341
second inquiry: does impairment of those rights violate due process?
333. Id. at 1372-73; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
334. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1372-73; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The provision in the amendment to the Act (AB
2580) clarified that the date of registration was intended to correspond to the date of marriage for the
administration of rights and responsibilities. A.B. 2580, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). This has
been interpreted as an express provision for retroactivity. See Matsumura, supra note 5, at 193.
336. In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 357 (Cal. 1985); see also supra note 168 and
accompanying text. As previously noted, the Buol court explicitly directed that, "the retrospective
application of a statute may be unconstitutional if it is an ex post facto law, if it deprives a person of
a vested right without due process of law, or if it impairs the obligation of a contract." Buol, 705
P.2d at 357. The focus of this inquiry is the deprivation of a vested right without due process.
337. See supra note 169.
338. In re Marriage of Hilke, 841 P.2d 891, 896 (Cal. 1992); Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376 n.7; Buot,
705 P.2d at 357 n.6.
339. See supra note 339.
340. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376; see also supra note 171 (stating that the character of property is
determined at the time it is acquired).
341. Supra note 168 and accompanying text.

779

Vested property interests may be impaired by legislation that protects the

"health, safety, morals, and general well being of the people" or some other
sufficiently significant state interest. 342 In other words, as long as the state
interest is important enough to override the guarantees of the Constitution,

the court will not interfere. Therefore, the analysis is incomplete without
knowledge of the state interest for the Act.
Unlike many of the precedent cases where the court had to uncover the

state interest behind the respective legislation, the bill in this case explicitly
announces California's interest in promulgating domestic partner legislation.
It said: "[t]his act is intended to ... further the state's interests in promoting

stable and lasting family relationships, and protecting Californians from the
economic and social consequences of abandonment, separation, the death of
loved ones, and other life crises. 3 4 3 While the state interest is clear,

determining whether or not it is weighty enough to justify abrogating vested
property rights leaves the court with little more than a decision between two
sides.
It is at this point that our analysis is further aided by Bouquet. That
court provided factors to be considered in making this constitutional
determination. First, the state's position is accounted for by considering the
following: (1) "the significance of the state interest served by the law" and
(2) "the importance of the retroactive application of the law to the

effectuation of that interest.,

344

Against the state concern should be weighed

the interests of the individual affected: (3) "the extent of reliance upon the

former law;" (4) "the legitimacy of that reliance;" (5) "the extent of actions
taken on the basis of that reliance;" and (6) "the extent to which
the
3 45
retroactive application of the new law would disrupt those actions.
Surely the state's interest in protecting its citizens and promoting stable
relationships is significant.346 Yet the significance of the state interest in

both Addison and Bouquet was reinforced by the "rank injustice of the
former law.

' 3 47

Thus, the two government factors not only involve current

342. Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 902 (Cal. 1965); see also supra note 126.
343. A.B. 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
344. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376; see also supra note 156 and accompanying text; Reppy, supra
note 142, at 1048. Reppy's article blends Bouquet's factors with the balancing test from Tennis'
article. Tennis, supra note 107, at 518.
345. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376; see also supra note 156 and accompanying text; Reppy, supra
note 142, at 1048; Tennis, supra note 107, at 518.
346. In both Addison and Bouquet, the courts justified their intrusion on vested property interests
by noting a significant state interest in "supervision of material property and dissolutions." Bouquet,
546 P.2d at 1377. The interest stated in this case does not directly mention property distribution;
rather, it refers to property in its statements on protecting citizens from the financial hardships
occasioned by ill occurrences in relationships. See id. Thus, while the two state interests are not
identical, they are congruent.
347. Id. The former law in Addison would have left the faithful party to a marriage without any
spousal protection while the infidel of the relationship was left to maintain his property as if the
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legislation, but they should also consider the state of the law as it existed
previously.348
In this case, nothing in California law provided for court supervised
property distributions for couples like Smith and Velez. The only way they
could have gotten the court to intervene was to contractually provide for
property rights at the beginning of the relationship. The court would have
then supervised effectuation of the contract. 349 But in the absence of such an
agreement, there is the potential that Velez will be left with nothing after
contributing her energies to the relationship. Potentially, Velez (or others
similarly situated) could exit litigation unprotected from "the economic and
35 0
social consequences of abandonment, separation ...and other life crises.
This possibility directly contravenes the very interest which the Legislature
"
claims motivated the Act.35
'
According to Buol, the inquiry could stop here; yet for the sake of
illustration, the analysis continues to the other side of the balance.352 The
individual interests of Velez, Smith, and other California registered domestic
partners also should be considered.353 The extent of reliance which Smith
and Velez placed on the former law is hard to gauge in this hypothetical.
We know the couple purchased both real and personal property and had joint
bank accounts.354 These property acquisitions were made in reliance upon
what they believed to be the prevailing state of the law. The couple had
nothing else to rely upon in ordering their affairs.35 5 Reliance alone is not
sufficient; it must also be legitimate. In light of the ever-changing nature of

relationship had never occurred. Addison, 399 P.2d at 903. According to the court, this was not
permissible; a sufficient state interest was thereby augmented by the patent unfairness of the prior
law. But see In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 360 (Cal. 1985) (noting that Bouquet and
Addison stood for the "proposition that the state's paramount interest in the equitable dissolution of
the marital partnership justifies legislative action abrogating rights in marital property where those
rights derive from manifestly unfair laws" but that "[n]o such compelling reason exist[ed]" in that
case).
348. Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1377.
349. See supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
350. A.B. 205, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
351. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
352. Buol, 705 P.2d at 360 ("Where 'retroactive application is necessary to subserve a sufficiently
important state interest,' the inquiry need proceed no further." (quoting Bouquet, 546 P.2d at 1376)).
353. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
355. The importance of providing stability in regulation is discussed in Part II. See supra note 97
and accompanying text.

registered domestic partnerships,35 6 it would be an act of judicial hindsight
to claim that the couple's reliance was anything other than legitimate.357
Despite the clarity of Smith and Velez's legitimate reliance on prior law,
there is some possibility that California mitigated the ill effects of
retroactively applying the Act to domestic partners registered before its
enactment."' The Act specifically required the Secretary of State to send
out three separate notice letters to domestic partners for whom it had contact
information (i.e. those registered at the time).35 9 The letters were to be sent,
"[o]n or before June 30, 2004... again on or before December 1, 2004, and
again on or before January 31, 2005 ....
According to at least one observer, these letters, in addition to the
website notice and extension for filing pre-registration agreements, likely
defeated any legitimacy couples had in reliance on the old law. 361 The
argument goes that the practical issues involved in correcting the situation
after proper notice of the law has been provided, outweigh the very purpose
of providing notice.362 However, this position presumes an even more
fundamental problem with practicality-that the notice reached its intended
recipients.
This article takes no issue with the methods employed by the Secretary
of State to alert registered domestic partners of the statutory amendments
directly affecting them. To the contrary, it is readily recognizable that the
Secretary of State employed all measures reasonable, short of personally
knocking on the doors of each couple that had registered.363 Yet, the interest
being protected here is significant enough to override any claims of
constructive notice.3 Itmatters little whether couples actually received the
356. See supra notes 42-94 and accompanying text.
357. For a statement on the legitimacy of reliance on California community property laws, see
Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 818 (Ct. App. 2005). In
dealing with the wrongful death amendments, that court recognized, "[i]t
is easy to see how an
individual could have relied on the community property laws Bouquet considered." Id. The court
also identified the extent of citizens' actions in light of their reliance: "People may spend or save,
marry or divorce, in reliance on those laws .....Id.
358. See Matsumura, supra note 5, at 192-93.
359. Seesupra note 90.
360. CAL. FAM. CODE § 299.3(a) (West 2006).
361. Matsumura, supra note 5, at 221. The author cites to Heikes, where the court did not allow
the fact that the law had been passed eight years prior to the suit to affect its holding against
retroactive application. Id.
362. Id. at 221. Matsumura identifies the practicality issue of Mrs. Heikes obtaining notice from
her husband after the law was enacted. Id. Recognizing this problem, Matsumura claims, "it
appears that the mitigation devices of the Act will not suffice to make the retroactive imposition of
community property responsibilities constitutional." Id.
363. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
364. There are two types of due process: procedural and substantive. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr.
Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Va. 1989). As to the former, "[p]rocedural due process guarantees a
litigant the right to reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard .... [T]he purpose
of the guarantee is to provide procedural safeguards against a government's arbitrary deprivation of
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notice letters in the mail or whether they were diligent in checking the
Secretary of State's website for updates. Mitigation efforts by the Secretary
of State fail in the face of the rights the court would potentially sacrifice by
not applying the Act retroactively. 365
Here, Smith stands to lose one-half of her interest in property she
acquired during the five-year period of partnership in question. This is a
prospect that married men and women have dealt with since the introduction

of the community property system.366 On the other side, Velez may have
relied, to her detriment, on her interests in shared property and Smith's

financial support. Leaving Velez without recourse for the five years in
question is a greater harm than that faced by Smith and is not affected by the
provision of notice required under the Act.

certain interests." Id. Substantive due process on the other hand "tests the reasonableness of a
statute vis-A-vis the legislature's power to enact the law." Id. The substantive component of due
process is what is at issue here-being determined by the balancing of interests laid out above. See
supra note 333 and accompanying text. Thus, while a state's showing of constructive notice may
meet the procedural due process requirements, the substantive due process analysis will fail because
of the balancing of interests in favor of the individual.
365. See In re Marriage of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1357 (Cal. 1995) (holding that a six-year
period between the initiation of the law and the commencement of the divorce action constituted
notice but was insufficient "to offset the other factors that ... call[ed] for protection of [the wife's]
vested property right against retroactive enforcement of husband's claim to reimbursement"); see
also Matsumura, supra note 5, at 221-22. Matsumura's analysis of the same topic, although
reaching a different conclusion, states a helpful proposition:
[T]he various mitigation devices created by the legislature .. .would not necessarily
defeat [a] reliance claim .... [Even though pleople are presumed to have knowledge of
the law .. .the [Heikes] court ruled that notice of the change in law does not 'cure' the
otherwise suspect retroactivity if the ability to cure is theoretical and not realistic.
Id. at 221.
Similar to the Heikes holding, the court would likely find it equally difficult for an individual
to obtain a written waiver of any and all rights to property interests and future support claims from
his or her partner, especially in the case of financial dependence. Id. at 221-22.
Additionally, the content of the notice is critical to determining whether or not it was sufficient
to override the rights threatened. While the letters and web posting advised partners of the
expansion of rights and the providence of consulting an attorney, they said nothing about
retroactivity. See supra note 90; see also Matsumura, supra note 5, at 192. In fact, the letters gave
the impression that the new rights and responsibilities only applied after January 1, 2005. See supra
note 90. Thus, even if every registered domestic couple were to have physically received the letters
or read the website, actual notice of the Act's potential affects and the ability of partners to cure,
remains questionable.
366. Comparing Smith's risk of losing property to that of married couples is not intended to
belittle the extent of the loss. The point of the comparison is to demonstrate that courts and society
have long accepted this eventuality as part of the cost of admission. Entering oneself into a staterecognized relationship directly places one under the structure of the state-sponsored property
distribution scheme-in this case, community property. One should expect when entering into such
a relationship that his or her property interests may be altered should he or she choose to later
terminate the relationship.
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As for the extent to which the proposed legislation disrupts individual
actions taken in reliance on the former law, Buol states that, "[t]he net effect
of retroactive legislation is that parties . . . cannot intelligently plan a
settlement of their affairs nor even conclude their affairs with certainty after
a trial based on then-applicable law., 367 This same concern applies to
retroactive application of community property laws as to Velez and Smith.
Smith can very well argue that the state's interest in stability of the laws and
predictability of their effect should force the holding in her favor.368 Yet,
courts have often validated retroactive laws in spite of this very
contention. 369
Despite strong countervailing concerns, the interest in providing rights
for domestic partners where none previously existed is significant. In fact,
the complete lack of protection for registered domestic partners before the
Act is amply repugnant to justify this divestiture of Smith's vested property
rights. Due to the above balancing of interests, when faced with whether to
retroactively apply the California community property system to domestic
partners registered before January 1, 2005, California courts will likely
decide in the affirmative. To hold to the contrary would abrogate the
protections central to the Act's purpose for a significant number of
individuals.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of the Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities
Act of 2003, California same-sex couples have seen slight and slow changes
to the legal rights they are afforded.37 ° Not only do the minds of the public
have to bend themselves to new ideas, but citizens have to exercise their
rights and sue under the laws so they are tested and sufficiently defined.
Although this process has yet to occur for the Act, the case testing
its constitutionality will inevitably arise. As for predicting the outcome of
that case, nothing is a better predictor of future behavior than past
performance. Such is the American system of justice. It is for that reason
that the Act's resilience can be reasonably anticipated. It is also for
that reason that future amendments will likely add to the panoply of rights
granted same-sex couples. Future advancement will likely come in a fashion
similar to past progress-slow and steady. In fact, legislation in this
area is constant. In January 2007, new legislation passed granting domestic

367. In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 362 (Cal. 1985) (quotations omitted).
368. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
369. See Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1965); see also In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546
P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976).
370. See supra notes 42-94 and accompanying text.
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partners eight additional protections. 37' One bill required equal benefits
in state contracts after the first of the year.3 72 Another gave domestic
partners the right to file joint state tax returns for the 2007 tax year. 73 The
list of advances continues as it began-incrementally. As the gap between
domestic partners and married couples narrows, new issues will arise.
New laws will be challenged and new rights questioned. But in that slow
development, it is not the speed at which the rights arrive that is important;
what is crucial is the power of those new rights to withstand inevitable
challenges.
Ryan M. Deam*

371. A.B. 17, 2003 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
372. Equality California, Eight New Laws Advancing LGBT Equal Rights and Protections Go Into
Effect January 1 (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://www.eqca.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=9
oINKWMCF&b=40337&ct=3318667. The right to file the returns does not accrue until 2008 but
provides for joint tax status for the 2007 tax year. Id.
373. S.B. 1827, 2006 Reg. Sess. (2006).
* J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 2007.

785

786

